This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
The Defendant and a co-defendant were indicted on two counts of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon and one count of concealing identity. On the day jury selection was scheduled, the Defendant was absent, leading the trial court to sever the trials. Later, at the Defendant's request, the trials were reconsolidated, and the Defendant waived his right to be present during jury selection. The trial proceeded, and both defendants were convicted (paras 2-9).
Procedural History
- District Court, July 1998: The Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon (para 9).
Parties' Submissions
- Defendant-Appellant: Argued that the trial court violated Rule 5-612 by reconsolidating the trials and proceeding with jury selection in his absence, which constituted a structural defect that could not be waived (paras 1, 18).
- Plaintiff-Appellee: Contended that the Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to be present during jury selection and that the trial court acted within its discretion (paras 8, 26).
Legal Issues
- Did the trial court violate Rule 5-612 by reconsolidating the trials and proceeding with jury selection in the Defendant's absence?
- Can a Defendant retroactively waive the right to be present at the commencement of a trial under Rule 5-612?
Disposition
- The Defendant's convictions were reversed, and the case was remanded for a new trial (para 21).
Reasons
Majority Opinion (Per Alarid J., Kennedy J. concurring):
The court held that Rule 5-612 requires a defendant to be present at the commencement of their trial, and this right is non-waivable unless the defendant was "initially present" when the trial began. The Defendant's absence during jury selection constituted a structural defect that could not be remedied by a retroactive waiver. The court emphasized that the requirement of initial presence serves an independent value beyond the reliability of the trial's outcome and is akin to a structural error, necessitating automatic reversal (paras 10-20).
Dissenting Opinion (Pickard C.J.):
Chief Judge Pickard dissented, arguing that the Defendant made a clear, knowing, and unequivocal waiver of his right to be present during jury selection. The trial court acted on the Defendant's request to reconsolidate the trials, and the waiver was explicit and tactical. Pickard contended that the Defendant should be held to his waiver and that any related claims, such as ineffective assistance of counsel, should be addressed in post-conviction proceedings rather than on direct appeal (paras 23-28).