This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
The Defendant, after being unable to speak with his ex-wife at her workplace, later encountered her on the road. While driving a Nissan Maxima, the Defendant rammed her Lincoln LS multiple times, causing her to lose control and crash. A witness testified that the Defendant subsequently drove into the driver's side of the Lincoln after it had stopped. The Defendant claimed he did not intend to kill his ex-wife but only wanted to damage the car (paras 2-5).
Procedural History
- District Court of Lea County: The Defendant was convicted of attempted second-degree murder.
Parties' Submissions
- Defendant-Appellant: Argued that the jury instructions allowed for a conviction based on an invalid theory of attempted second-degree reckless or unintentional murder, which is not a legally recognized crime (para 1).
- Plaintiff-Appellee: Contended that the jury instructions properly required the jury to find that the Defendant intended to commit second-degree murder, and the conviction was valid (paras 10-13).
Legal Issues
- Whether the jury instructions allowed for a conviction of attempted second-degree reckless or unintentional murder, a legally invalid crime.
- Whether the jury instructions adequately required the jury to find that the Defendant intended to kill his ex-wife to convict him of attempted second-degree murder.
Disposition
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the Defendant's conviction for attempted second-degree murder (para 16).
Reasons
Per Wechsler J. (Bustamante and Robinson JJ. concurring):
The Court found that the jury instructions, when read together, required the jury to find that the Defendant intended to kill his ex-wife to convict him of attempted second-degree murder. Instruction No. 6 explicitly required the jury to find that the Defendant intended to commit second-degree murder, while Instruction No. 7 outlined the elements of second-degree murder, including the knowledge of creating a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. Together, these instructions ensured that the jury could not convict the Defendant based on a reckless or unintentional standard (paras 9-10).
The Court rejected the Defendant's argument that the State relied on a theory of reckless or unintentional murder, noting that the prosecutor consistently argued that the Defendant intended to kill his ex-wife. The Court also distinguished this case from prior precedent, emphasizing that the jury instructions in this case adequately addressed the issue of intent (paras 12-15).