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Facts

The Defendant, an environmental consultant, was convicted of eight counts under the Water Quality Act (WQA) for knowingly causing or allowing the discharge of contaminants and failing to monitor, sample, or report as required by a discharge permit (DP-854). The permit, issued in 1992, expired in 1997, but a clerical error in a 1995 modification letter mistakenly extended its expiration date to 2000. The Defendant believed the permit was valid during the alleged violations, which occurred between 1998 and 2000 (paras 2-3, 6-7).

Procedural History

  • District Court of Doña Ana County: The Defendant was convicted of eight counts under the WQA for violations related to the expired discharge permit (headnotes, para 1).

Parties' Submissions

  • Defendant-Appellant: Argued that the permit had expired, making it legally impossible to violate its terms, and that the trial court erred in denying a directed verdict. Additionally, the Defendant claimed the statute was unconstitutionally vague, the jury instructions were improper, and the admission of certain evidence was prejudicial (paras 3, 27, 34, 39).
  • Plaintiff-Appellee (State): Contended that the permit was treated as valid by all parties, creating a "de facto" permit, and argued that the Defendant knowingly caused or allowed violations. The State also requested that, if the convictions were reversed, the case be remanded for resentencing on the lesser included offense of attempt (paras 9, 11, 39).

Legal Issues

  • Was there sufficient evidence to support the Defendant's convictions under the WQA, given the expiration of the discharge permit?
  • Is attempt to commit a violation of the WQA a lesser included offense?
  • Is the WQA unconstitutionally vague as applied to the Defendant?
  • Did the trial court err in refusing the Defendant's proposed jury instructions?
  • Did the trial court err in admitting certain documentary evidence?

Disposition

  • The Defendant's convictions were reversed due to insufficient evidence.
  • The case was remanded to the trial court for resentencing on the lesser included offense of attempt to commit the violations.
  • The trial court's rulings on the constitutionality of the statute, jury instructions, and evidentiary issues were affirmed (paras 1, 20, 45).

Reasons

Per Pickard J. (Castillo J. concurring):

  • Sufficiency of Evidence: The court found that the permit had expired in 1997, and there was no legal basis to consider it valid during the alleged violations. Since the existence of a valid permit was a necessary element of the charged offenses, the convictions could not stand (paras 6-10).

  • Lesser Included Offense: The court held that attempt to commit the violations was a lesser included offense. The Defendant's belief that the permit was valid and his actions in furtherance of compliance with the permit satisfied the elements of attempt. The jury's findings on the greater offense necessarily encompassed the elements of attempt, making resentencing appropriate (paras 11-20).

  • Constitutionality of the WQA: The court rejected the Defendant's vagueness challenge, finding that the statute provided sufficient notice of prohibited conduct. The Defendant, as an environmental expert, was aware of the permit's requirements and the violations occurring under his supervision (paras 27-32).

  • Jury Instructions: The court upheld the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on statutory limitations to the WQA, as the proposed instructions misinterpreted the law and were irrelevant to the charges (paras 34-38).

  • Evidentiary Issues: The court determined that the admission of a lab report regarding contaminants was harmless error. The report was minimally referenced, and substantial evidence of other contaminants supported the convictions (paras 39-44).

Per Kennedy J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part):

  • Kennedy J. agreed with reversing the convictions due to insufficient evidence but dissented from the decision to remand for resentencing on attempt. He argued that the State had waived the issue of attempt by not pursuing it at trial and that convicting the Defendant of an uncharged offense violated his due process rights. Kennedy J. also contended that legal impossibility precluded a conviction for attempt in this case, as the absence of a valid permit rendered the charged conduct a different crime (paras 47-78).
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