AI Generated Opinion Summaries

This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

The Petitioner’s driving privileges were revoked following an arrest for driving while intoxicated on February 3, 1994. The Petitioner requested an administrative hearing within ten days of the revocation, as permitted by statute. The Department scheduled the hearing for April 20, 1994, more than two months after the notice of revocation. No continuances were requested by either party, and the hearing officer upheld the revocation (paras 1-2).

Procedural History

• District Court, initial decision: The court affirmed the Department's decision, finding that the statute did not require the hearing to be held within thirty days (para 2).
• District Court, reconsideration: Upon reconsideration, the court reversed the Department's decision, holding that the Department failed to comply with the statutory thirty-day requirement for scheduling the hearing (para 2).

Parties' Submissions

• Petitioner (Appellee): Argued that the thirty-day time limit in Section 66-8-112(B) is mandatory and that the Department’s failure to comply with this requirement invalidated the revocation. The Petitioner also contended that the Department could only schedule a hearing beyond thirty days by moving for a continuance under Section 66-8-112(C) (paras 1, 4).
• Respondent (Appellant): Asserted that the thirty-day time limit in Section 66-8-112(B) is directory, not mandatory, and that the failure to schedule the hearing within thirty days did not invalidate the revocation. The Department also argued that the statutory language “if practical” modifies the thirty-day requirement, allowing flexibility (paras 1, 4).

Legal Issues

• Is the thirty-day time limit for scheduling a hearing under Section 66-8-112(B) mandatory or directory?
• Did the Department’s failure to schedule the hearing within thirty days violate the Petitioner’s procedural due process rights?

Disposition

• The Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s order and reinstated the Department’s revocation of the Petitioner’s driving privileges (para 10).

Reasons

Per Pickard J. (Donnelly and Black JJ. concurring):

• The Court held that the thirty-day time limit in Section 66-8-112(B) is directory, not mandatory. The statutory language “if practical” modifies the word “shall,” indicating that the Department is required to schedule the hearing within thirty days only if it is practical to do so (paras 4, 6).
• The Court rejected the Petitioner’s argument that the Department could only schedule a hearing beyond thirty days by moving for a continuance under Section 66-8-112(C). The provision for continuances presupposes that a hearing has already been scheduled, and failure to schedule a hearing within thirty days does not invalidate the revocation proceeding (paras 4, 6).
• The Court found no violation of the Petitioner’s procedural due process rights. The hearing was held approximately two and a half months after the notice of revocation, which was not an unreasonable delay. The Petitioner failed to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from the delay (para 8).
• The Court emphasized that while the thirty-day provision is directory, the Department should make every effort to schedule hearings within that timeframe to comply with the statutory intent (para 9).