This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
The Plaintiff, acting as the personal representative of his deceased son’s estate, alleged that the Defendant, a nonprofit medical corporation, caused the death of his four-year-old son in 1959 by administering an overdose of sodium pentothal during a dental procedure. The child never regained consciousness and died three days later. The Plaintiff claimed he was initially informed that the death was due to hypersensitivity to the drug but discovered in 1987 that the true cause was an overdose (paras 1-3).
Procedural History
- District Court, Los Alamos County: Granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendant, holding that the Defendant, as a dissolved corporation, lacked the capacity to be sued (para 3).
Parties' Submissions
- Plaintiff-Appellant: Argued that the Defendant fraudulently concealed the true cause of death, which tolled the statute of limitations, and that the claim was timely filed after discovering the cause in 1987. The Plaintiff also contended that the survival statute applicable to nonprofit corporations did not bar the claim (paras 3-4, 10, 16).
- Defendant-Appellee: Asserted that as a dissolved corporation, it could no longer be sued under the applicable survival statute, which limited the time for bringing claims against dissolved nonprofit corporations to two years after dissolution. The Defendant argued that the claim was untimely and barred (paras 3-4, 10).
Legal Issues
- Whether the Plaintiff’s claim was barred by the survival statute applicable to dissolved nonprofit corporations.
- Whether the survival period could be tolled due to the Defendant’s alleged fraudulent concealment of the cause of death.
Disposition
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the Plaintiff’s complaint (para 18).
Reasons
Per Alarid J. (Minzner C.J. and Hartz J. concurring):
The Court held that the survival statute governing nonprofit corporations limited the time for bringing claims against dissolved entities to two years after dissolution. Although the Plaintiff argued that fraudulent concealment tolled the survival period, the Court noted that survival statutes are distinct from statutes of limitations and are generally not subject to equitable tolling. Even if tolling were applied, the Plaintiff’s claim would still be untimely, as it was filed more than two years after discovering the alleged fraudulent concealment in 1987. The Court also rejected the Plaintiff’s reliance on a savings clause in the 1975 Nonprofit Corporation Act, finding it inapplicable to the repeal of the earlier unlimited survival period. The Court concluded that the Defendant ceased to exist as a legal entity before the Plaintiff filed the lawsuit, barring the claim (paras 5-18).