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Decision Information

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Facts

The Defendant was charged with two counts of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon against a household member and one alternative count of aggravated battery causing great bodily harm. The charges stemmed from an incident where the victim, the Defendant's husband, initially claimed the Defendant attacked him with a trivet and an electric fan. However, at trial, the victim testified that his injuries were accidental, aligning with the Defendant's testimony (paras 1-2).

Procedural History

  • District Court of Bernalillo County: The Defendant was convicted of one count of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon (trivet) and the lesser included offense of aggravated battery not causing great bodily harm. The Defendant was acquitted of the second count of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon (electric fan) (para 1).

Parties' Submissions

  • Defendant-Appellant: Argued that (1) the trial court erred in admitting the victim's statements to police officers as excited utterances; (2) the trial court improperly refused to strike a juror for cause; (3) the prosecutor's improper question about the Defendant's prior convictions caused prejudice; and (4) the jury instruction improperly defined the trivet as a deadly weapon, removing an essential element of the offense from the jury's consideration (para 3).
  • Plaintiff-Appellee: Contended that (1) the victim's statements were admissible as excited utterances; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike the juror; (3) the prosecutor's question did not prejudice the Defendant; and (4) the jury instruction was proper (paras 4-24).

Legal Issues

  • Were the victim's statements to police officers admissible as excited utterances?
  • Did the trial court err in refusing to strike a juror for cause?
  • Did the prosecutor's improper question about the Defendant's prior convictions amount to prejudicial misconduct?
  • Did the jury instruction improperly define the trivet as a deadly weapon, thereby removing an essential element of the offense from the jury's consideration?

Disposition

  • The conviction for aggravated battery with a deadly weapon was reversed, and the case was remanded for a new trial on that charge (para 29).
  • The conviction for aggravated battery not causing great bodily harm was affirmed (para 29).

Reasons

Per Benny E. Flores J. (Apodaca and Armijo JJ. concurring):

Excited Utterances: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the victim's statements to the first two officers as excited utterances, as they were made shortly after the incident while the victim was still under stress. However, the statements to the later officers were improperly admitted because they were made after a significant time had passed, and the victim was no longer under the stress of the event. Nonetheless, this error was deemed harmless because the improperly admitted statements were cumulative of other admissible evidence (paras 4-14).

Juror Challenge: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike a juror who expressed a potential bias toward police testimony. The juror stated they could judge the evidence fairly, and the trial court was entitled to rely on this assurance (paras 15-19).

Prosecutor's Question: The prosecutor's question about the Defendant's prior convictions violated a pretrial ruling but did not result in prejudice. The jury was already aware of the Defendant's prior convictions, and the question did not reveal any new or impermissible information (paras 20-24).

Jury Instruction: The jury instruction improperly defined the trivet as a deadly weapon, removing the jury's role in determining whether the trivet met the statutory definition. This constituted reversible error, as it deprived the Defendant of a fair trial on the aggravated battery with a deadly weapon charge (paras 25-28).

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