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Decision Information

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This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

The case involves two separate incidents of alleged battery upon peace officers. In the first, a defendant spat on an officer while being transported in a patrol car after being arrested for driving under the influence, with the spit landing on the officer's face and shoulder (paras 2-3). In the second, a defendant in solitary confinement at a detention center spat on one officer and later threw urine on another, following a series of disruptive behaviors, including flooding his cell and yelling threats (paras 4-5).

Procedural History

  • District Court of San Juan County: The trial court dismissed the charge against the first defendant, finding that the stipulated facts did not satisfy the elements of battery upon a peace officer under the relevant jury instruction (para 3).
  • District Court of Roosevelt County: The second defendant was convicted by a jury of two counts of battery upon a peace officer. The trial court refused the defendant's request for a jury instruction that included language requiring a "meaningful challenge to authority" or "actual threat to safety" (paras 5, 16-17).

Parties' Submissions

  • Plaintiff-Appellant (State): Argued that spitting and throwing urine on peace officers constituted battery under the statute and requested reinstatement of the indictment in the first case and affirmation of the conviction in the second case (paras 3, 16).
  • Defendant-Appellee (First Defendant): Contended that the stipulated facts did not meet the statutory requirements for battery upon a peace officer, as there was no "actual injury, actual threat to safety, or meaningful challenge to authority" (para 3).
  • Defendant-Appellant (Second Defendant): Argued that the trial court erred in refusing to give a jury instruction reflecting the requirements established in State v. Padilla, which would have required the jury to find a "meaningful challenge to authority" or "actual threat to safety" (paras 16-17).

Legal Issues

  • Whether spitting or throwing urine on a peace officer constitutes battery under the statute (para 1).
  • Whether the jury instruction for battery upon a peace officer must include language requiring a "meaningful challenge to authority" or "actual threat to safety" when requested by the defendant (para 8).

Disposition

  • The dismissal of the charge against the first defendant was reversed, and the indictment was reinstated (para 15).
  • The conviction of the second defendant was reversed, and the case was remanded for a new trial with proper jury instructions (para 20).

Reasons

Per Bosson J. (Bustamante and Armijo JJ. concurring):

  • The court held that spitting or throwing urine on a peace officer could constitute battery under the statute, depending on the context. A jury could find that such actions posed an "actual threat to safety" or a "meaningful challenge to authority" (paras 15, 18).
  • The court emphasized that the statutory purpose is to protect the safety and authority of peace officers, but only conduct rising above "mere affronts to personal dignity" should be punishable as a felony (paras 6-7).
  • The court found that the jury instruction must reflect the requirements established in State v. Padilla, including the need for an "actual injury, actual threat to safety, or meaningful challenge to authority," when the issue is in dispute and the defendant requests such language (paras 9-10).
  • In the first case, the stipulated facts could support a finding of a meaningful challenge to authority or an actual threat to safety, warranting reinstatement of the indictment (para 15).
  • In the second case, the trial court erred in refusing the defendant's requested jury instruction and in limiting defense counsel's ability to argue the point to the jury. This error was not harmless, as the evidence was not overwhelming, necessitating a new trial (paras 16-18).
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