This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
The case involves a dispute over unpaid child support for a severely disabled adult child. The Respondent was ordered in 1986 to pay $250 per month for the support of his son, who has been mentally and physically handicapped since birth. The son, now an adult, requires constant care and supervision, which has been provided by the Petitioner. The Respondent failed to make any payments under the order (paras 1-2).
Procedural History
- District Court, April 6, 1977: Issued a partial final decree dissolving the marriage and reserved jurisdiction over issues of property division and support (para 3).
- District Court, October 1986: Ordered the Respondent to pay $250 per month for the support of the disabled son and divided the community property (paras 2-3).
- District Court, 1995: Found the Respondent liable for $45,868.86 in past-due child support and upheld the 1986 judgment (para 4).
Parties' Submissions
- Appellant (Respondent): Argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to enforce post-majority child support and that only the legislature could impose such an obligation. He also contended that the 1986 judgment was void because the court lost jurisdiction over support issues after the 1977 partial final judgment (paras 5, 9).
- Appellee (Petitioner): Asserted that the Respondent had a continuing common-law duty to support their severely disabled son, who was incapable of emancipation due to his condition. She sought enforcement of the 1986 judgment and payment of arrears with interest (paras 2-4, 6).
Legal Issues
- Does a parent have a common-law duty to support a severely disabled child beyond the age of majority?
- Did the district court have jurisdiction to enforce the 1986 judgment for post-majority child support?
- Was the 1986 judgment void due to the court allegedly losing jurisdiction after the 1977 partial final judgment?
Disposition
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the 1995 judgment of the district court, holding the Respondent liable for past-due child support and upholding the 1986 judgment (para 10).
Reasons
Per Bustamante J. (Donnelly and Hartz JJ. concurring):
The Court held that parents have a common-law duty to support a severely disabled child if the disability existed before the child reached the age of majority. This duty continues indefinitely because the child is considered unemancipated due to their inability to care for themselves. The Court cited precedent and legal commentary supporting this principle (paras 5-6).
The Court found no legislative intent in Section 40-4-7 to eliminate the common-law duty to support disabled adult children. The statute does not preclude courts from enforcing such obligations, even in cases involving divorced parents (paras 7-8).
The Court rejected the Respondent's argument that the 1986 judgment was void. It determined that the district court had properly reserved jurisdiction over support issues in the 1977 partial final judgment, allowing it to issue the 1986 order. The Respondent's failure to appeal the 1986 judgment within the allowed time foreclosed his challenge under the collateral bar rule (paras 4, 9).
The Court awarded the Petitioner $2,500 in attorney's fees and costs on appeal (para 10).