AI Generated Opinion Summaries

This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

A worker employed by the City of Albuquerque sustained spinal injuries in a motor vehicle accident while driving to a meeting at the mayor's office on October 30, 1997. The worker filed a workers' compensation complaint on January 6, 1999, and later entered into a stipulated compensation order with the employer in March 2001 (paras 2-3).

Procedural History

• Workers' Compensation Judge, March 30, 2001: The stipulated compensation order was entered, and the judge determined that attorney's fees would be split equally between the worker and the employer (paras 3-4, 20).

Parties' Submissions

• Appellant (Worker): Argued that the employer should pay 100% of her attorney's fees under NMSA 1978, § 52-1-54(F)(4), as the stipulated compensation order awarded her more benefits than the employer's prior offer of judgment (paras 4, 11).
• Appellee (Employer): Contended that the fee-shifting provision did not apply because the case was resolved through a settlement rather than a formal adjudication, and the requested attorney's fees were excessive (paras 4, 19).

Legal Issues

• Does the fee-shifting provision of NMSA 1978, § 52-1-54(F)(4) apply to a stipulated compensation order where the worker recovers more benefits than an earlier rejected offer of judgment?

Disposition

• The Court of Appeals held that the fee-shifting provision of NMSA 1978, § 52-1-54(F)(4) applies to the stipulated compensation order and remanded the case for a new award requiring the employer to pay 100% of the worker's attorney's fees (paras 11-12).

Reasons

Per A. Joseph Alarid J. (Cynthia A. Fry and Roderick T. Kennedy JJ. concurring):

The Court found that the Workers' Compensation Judge (WCJ) erred in interpreting NMSA 1978, § 52-1-54(F)(4). The statute's language, "the amount awarded by the compensation order," is neutral regarding whether the order results from a settlement or a formal hearing. The Court emphasized that the statute aims to encourage reasonable offers of judgment and penalize parties who reject such offers and prolong litigation. Allowing the employer to avoid fee-shifting by settling late in the process would undermine this policy. Since the worker recovered more benefits than the rejected offer of judgment, the employer is responsible for 100% of the attorney's fees under the statute (paras 9-11).