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This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

The Defendant was charged with multiple offenses, including larceny of a firearm, larceny over $250, felon in possession of a firearm, and unlawful carrying of a deadly weapon. He entered into a plea agreement, pleading guilty to larceny over $250 and felon in possession of a firearm, while the other charges were dismissed. The plea agreement included provisions for habitual offender enhancements based on prior felony convictions and stipulated that additional enhancements could be applied if the Defendant violated probation or parole conditions (paras 3-4).

Procedural History

  • District Court, December 9, 2002: The Defendant was sentenced under a plea agreement to concurrent terms of 18 months for larceny over $250 and felon in possession of a firearm, with a four-year habitual offender enhancement applied to the larceny charge. After a probation violation, the court imposed the full sentence, including an additional habitual offender enhancement for the felon in possession charge (paras 4-5).

Parties' Submissions

  • Appellant (Defendant): Argued that the 1985 conviction for possession of marijuana could not be used to enhance his sentence under the 2002 amendment to the habitual offender statute, as it occurred more than ten years prior to the current conviction. Additionally, the Defendant contended that the sentencing order was ambiguous and violated protections against double jeopardy by improperly splitting sentences (paras 5, 10-12).
  • Appellee (State): Asserted that the 2002 amendment to the habitual offender statute did not apply because the original sentence was imposed before the amendment's effective date. The State also argued that the habitual offender enhancement was consistent with the plea agreement, which the Defendant had agreed to and benefitted from (paras 7-9).

Legal Issues

  • Does the 2002 amendment to the habitual offender statute apply to the Defendant's sentence for a probation violation when the original sentence was imposed prior to the amendment's effective date?
  • Did the district court's sentencing order violate protections against double jeopardy by improperly splitting sentences?

Disposition

  • The Court of Appeals held that the 2002 amendment to the habitual offender statute did not apply to the Defendant's sentence because the original sentence was imposed before the amendment's effective date (para 16).
  • The Court reversed the sentencing order due to ambiguity and remanded the case for correction of the sentence (para 16).

Reasons

Per Wechsler CJ (Alarid and Fry JJ. concurring):

  • The Court determined that the 2002 amendment to the habitual offender statute, which excludes certain prior convictions from enhancement if ten years or more have passed, did not apply because the Defendant's original sentence was imposed before the amendment's effective date. The Court reasoned that the probation violation did not constitute a new crime triggering the amendment but rather related to the original sentence, which was governed by the pre-amendment statute (paras 7-8).
  • The Court emphasized that the Defendant had waived his right to object to the habitual offender enhancement as part of the plea agreement, which he had benefitted from. The agreement explicitly allowed for additional enhancements in the event of a probation violation (para 9).
  • Regarding the sentencing ambiguity, the Court found that the order improperly split the sentences for larceny over $250 and felon in possession of a firearm, which were originally ordered to run concurrently. The Court noted that the district court's intent at the sentencing hearing differed from the written order, necessitating a remand for correction to ensure the sentences were properly concurrent and consistent with the plea agreement (paras 10-15).
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