AI Generated Opinion Summaries

This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

An employee suffered a work-related injury on October 27, 1984. The employer did not file a certificate of pre-existing impairment before the injury, although the employer's actual knowledge of the worker's alleged pre-existing condition was disputed. The employer later sought to involve the New Mexico Subsequent Injury Fund (the Fund) in the case, but failed to provide the required ninety-day written notice of its intent to file a claim against the Fund (paras 2-3).

Procedural History

• Workers' Compensation Division: Granted summary judgment in favor of the Fund, dismissing the employer's claim for failure to file a certificate of pre-existing impairment and denying the Fund's alternative motion for summary judgment based on lack of ninety-day notice (headnotes, paras 1, 6).

Parties' Submissions

• Employer (Appellant/Cross-Appellee): Argued that under the law in effect at the time of the injury, recovery from the Fund was permissible without filing a certificate of pre-existing impairment, provided the employer had actual knowledge of the worker's pre-existing condition. Also contended that the ninety-day notice requirement should not apply retroactively to its claim (paras 3, 6-7).
• Subsequent Injury Fund (Respondent/Cross-Appellant): Asserted that the 1988 amendments to the Subsequent Injury Act, including the certificate and notice requirements, applied to the employer's claim. Further argued that the employer's failure to provide ninety-day notice barred the claim, regardless of prejudice to the Fund (paras 1, 6, 14-15).

Legal Issues

• Did the 1988 amendment to the Subsequent Injury Act requiring a certificate of pre-existing impairment apply retroactively to the employer's claim?
• Did the ninety-day notice requirement under Section 52-2-14(B) apply retroactively to the employer's claim?
• Could the filing of the claim substitute for the ninety-day notice requirement?

Disposition

• The summary judgment in favor of the Fund based on the certificate requirement under Section 52-2-6(D) was reversed.
• The determination that the ninety-day notice requirement under Section 52-2-14(B) applied to the case was reversed.
• The case was remanded to determine when the employer's cause of action against the Fund accrued and for further proceedings (paras 16-17).

Reasons

Per Bivins CJ (Donnelly and Apodaca JJ. concurring):

• The court held that the 1988 amendment requiring a certificate of pre-existing impairment could not be applied retroactively, following the precedent set in Jojola v. Aetna Life Casualty. The court emphasized that new provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act apply only to causes of action accruing after their effective date unless expressly stated otherwise (paras 3-4).
• Similarly, the ninety-day notice requirement under Section 52-2-14(B) was determined to apply prospectively. The court rejected the Fund's argument that the provision was a procedural change warranting retroactive application, noting that notice provisions operate as conditions precedent akin to statutes of limitations (paras 7-10).
• The court clarified that the filing of a claim could not substitute for the ninety-day notice requirement, as this would render the statutory provision meaningless. The Workers' Compensation Division lacked authority to excuse the notice requirement based on lack of prejudice to the Fund (paras 14-15).
• The case was remanded to determine when the employer's cause of action accrued. If the cause of action accrued before March 8, 1988, the employer would be exempt from the notice requirement. If it accrued on or after that date, the notice provision would apply (paras 13, 16).