This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
The Defendant was involved in a car accident while under the influence of alcohol, resulting in two fatalities and one serious injury. The Defendant was charged and convicted of two counts of vehicular homicide while under the influence, one count of great bodily harm by vehicle while under the influence, and one count of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DWI) (paras 1, 3).
Procedural History
- District Court of McKinley County, Grant L. Foutz, District Judge: The Defendant was convicted by a jury of two counts of vehicular homicide while under the influence, one count of great bodily harm by vehicle while under the influence, and one count of DWI. The court merged the DWI sentence with the greater offenses but did not vacate the DWI conviction (headnotes, para 3).
Parties' Submissions
- Defendant-Appellant: Argued six points of error: (1) the DWI conviction violated double jeopardy; (2) the sentence was improperly enhanced using a prior tribal court DWI conviction; (3) the jury was not impartial; (4) the district court erred in denying a mistrial due to prosecutorial misconduct during voir dire; (5) prosecutorial misconduct during trial constituted cumulative error; and (6) the admission of blood-alcohol content (BAC) test results was improper (para 3).
- Plaintiff-Appellee: Conceded that the DWI conviction violated double jeopardy and should be vacated but argued that the sentence enhancement, jury selection, prosecutorial conduct, and admission of BAC evidence were proper (paras 4, 6, 8, 10, 12).
Legal Issues
- Was the Defendant’s DWI conviction barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause?
- Was the sentence enhancement based on a prior tribal court DWI conviction proper?
- Did the district court err in denying the Defendant’s challenges to the jury selection process?
- Did the prosecutor’s conduct during voir dire and trial constitute reversible error?
- Was the admission of the Defendant’s BAC-test results improper?
Disposition
- The Court of Appeals reversed the DWI conviction on double jeopardy grounds and remanded with instructions to vacate the conviction (para 4).
- The Court affirmed the district court’s rulings on all other issues, including the sentence enhancement, jury selection, prosecutorial conduct, and admission of BAC evidence (paras 6, 8, 10, 12).
Reasons
Per Sutin J. (Wechsler and Vigil JJ. concurring):
Double Jeopardy: The Court agreed with the Defendant and the State that the DWI conviction was a lesser-included offense of vehicular homicide and great bodily harm by vehicle while under the influence. Under established precedent, the conviction for the lesser offense must be vacated, not merely merged with the greater offenses (paras 4-5).
Sentence Enhancement: The Court found that the district court properly applied the statutory language in effect at the time, which allowed the use of tribal court DWI convictions for sentence enhancement. The Defendant conceded this point in his reply brief (paras 6-7).
Jury Selection: The Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Defendant’s challenges for cause against two jurors. The Defendant failed to use all available peremptory challenges and did not demonstrate prejudice. The Court also rejected the argument that the district court’s comments about the limited venire constituted reversible error (paras 8-9).
Prosecutorial Conduct: The Court found that the prosecutor’s questioning during voir dire and closing argument did not deprive the Defendant of a fair trial. Defense counsel effectively clarified any misstatements of law during voir dire, and the jury was properly instructed on the law. The Court also found no cumulative error (paras 10-11).
Admission of BAC Evidence: The Court upheld the admission of the BAC-test results, finding that the absence of the blood drawer’s testimony did not violate the Confrontation Clause under binding precedent. The Court also rejected the argument that the delay in drawing the blood rendered the results inadmissible, as the relevant regulation did not impose a strict two-hour limit (paras 12-13).