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This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

The Defendant was charged with the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle, a fourth-degree felony, on May 22, 1991. The Defendant applied for the Pre-Prosecution Diversion (PPD) program, which would have suspended criminal proceedings if accepted. However, the Defendant's application was ultimately rejected by the PPD program director on November 21, 1991. The Defendant later filed a motion to dismiss the criminal information with prejudice, arguing that the six-month time limit for commencing trial under Rule 5-604 had expired (paras 2-9).

Procedural History

  • District Court, January 30, 1992: The District Court dismissed the criminal information with prejudice, finding that the State failed to comply with the six-month time limit under Rule 5-604 (paras 1, 9).

Parties' Submissions

  • Plaintiff-Appellant (State): Argued that the six-month period for commencing trial recommenced on November 21, 1991, when the Defendant was notified of his rejection from the PPD program. The State contended that the dismissal with prejudice was improper because the time limit had not expired (paras 1, 3).
  • Defendant-Appellee: Claimed that the six-month period began on July 2, 1991, when the Defendant waived arraignment, and that the State failed to comply with the time limit. The Defendant also argued that the State's failure to dismiss the criminal information upon his acceptance into the PPD program and its failure to file a notice of termination violated procedural requirements (paras 3, 5-7).

Legal Issues

  • Whether the six-month period for commencing trial under Rule 5-604 recommenced when the Defendant was rejected from the PPD program.
  • Whether the State's alleged procedural irregularities, including failure to dismiss the criminal information and failure to file a notice of termination, justified dismissal with prejudice.

Disposition

  • The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's dismissal with prejudice and remanded the case for further proceedings (para 13).

Reasons

Per Hartz J. (Donnelly and Alarid JJ. concurring):

  • The Court held that the six-month period for commencing trial recommenced on November 21, 1991, when the Defendant was notified of his rejection from the PPD program. This conclusion applied regardless of whether the Defendant was admitted to and then terminated from the program or was never admitted (paras 3-4, 9-11).
  • The Court found that the State's failure to dismiss the criminal information upon the Defendant's acceptance into the PPD program, if any, was a contractual issue and did not justify dismissal with prejudice. The Defendant did not seek enforcement of the alleged contractual obligation, and the breach did not prejudice the Defendant's rights under Rule 5-604 (paras 5-6).
  • The Court also determined that the State's failure to file a notice of termination with the District Court did not prejudice the Defendant and, therefore, did not warrant dismissal with prejudice. The six-month period could still be calculated based on the date of the rejection letter (paras 7, 12).
  • The Court emphasized a "common sense" interpretation of Rule 5-604, consistent with prior case law, to avoid hypertechnical applications that would undermine the rule's purpose. The delay caused by the PPD application process was for the Defendant's benefit and should not count against the State in calculating the six-month period (paras 9-11).
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