This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
An employee of Circle K was injured during a robbery and obtained a judgment against Circle K for compensatory and punitive damages. Circle K held multiple insurance policies, including excess insurance from Lexington Insurance Company and International Surplus Lines Insurance Company (ISLIC). ISLIC entered into a settlement agreement with the injured employee, which Lexington alleged was designed to shift liability for the judgment onto Lexington, contrary to the terms of its policy (paras 2-6).
Procedural History
- District Court: Granted ISLIC's motion for summary judgment, finding that Lexington failed to present evidence supporting the elements of prima facie tort (para 1).
- New Mexico Court of Appeals: Certified the case to the Supreme Court of New Mexico due to questions of substantial public interest (para 1).
Parties' Submissions
- Appellant (Lexington Insurance Company): Argued that ISLIC, Circle K, and others committed prima facie tort by entering into a settlement agreement designed to shift liability for the judgment onto Lexington. Lexington claimed the settlement was intended to coerce it into paying sums not covered under its policy (paras 6-7).
- Appellee (ISLIC): Contended that Lexington failed to establish the necessary elements of prima facie tort, particularly the intent to injure. ISLIC argued that its actions were motivated by legitimate business interests, including reducing its liability and protecting its insured (paras 8, 15).
Legal Issues
- Did Lexington provide sufficient evidence to establish the elements of prima facie tort, particularly ISLIC's intent to injure Lexington?
Disposition
- The Supreme Court of New Mexico affirmed the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of ISLIC (para 17).
Reasons
Per Baca J. (Franchini C.J. and McKinnon J. concurring):
The Court held that Lexington failed to produce evidence of ISLIC's intent to injure, a necessary element of prima facie tort. The Court emphasized that prima facie tort requires proof of an actual intent to harm, not merely an intent to act in a way that results in harm. ISLIC's actions, including entering into the settlement agreement, were motivated by legitimate business interests, such as reducing its liability and protecting its insured, rather than malice or intent to harm Lexington. Without evidence of intent to injure, there was no need to balance ISLIC's intent against the justification for its actions. Consequently, Lexington did not rebut ISLIC's prima facie entitlement to summary judgment (paras 9-17).