This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
The case concerns the adjudication of water rights in the Rio Hondo River system, specifically the water rights of the Mescalero Apache Indian Reservation. The United States and the Mescalero Apache Tribe claimed water rights based on aboriginal title and a federally reserved water right, while the State of New Mexico and other parties contested these claims, arguing for a more limited allocation of water rights and a later priority date (paras 1-2).
Procedural History
- State ex rel. Reynolds v. Lewis, 88 N.M. 636, 545 P.2d 1014 (1976): The New Mexico Supreme Court held that the McCarran Amendment granted state courts jurisdiction over the United States as trustee of Indian water rights in general stream adjudications (para 1).
Parties' Submissions
- United States and Mescalero Apache Tribe (Appellants): Argued for a water right priority date of time immemorial based on aboriginal title or, alternatively, a priority date of 1852 based on a federally reserved water right under the 1852 treaty. They also claimed entitlement to 17,750.4 acre-feet of water annually, measured by the "practicably irrigable acreage" (PIA) standard (paras 2-4).
- State of New Mexico and Water Defense Association (Appellees): Contended that the priority date should be 1873, the date of the first executive order establishing the reservation, and that the Tribe's water rights should be limited to 2,322.4 acre-feet annually. They also cross-appealed, challenging the use of the PIA standard and seeking a consumptive-use cap on the awarded water (paras 3-5).
Legal Issues
- Whether the Mescalero Apache Tribe's water rights have a priority date of time immemorial, 1852, or 1873.
- Whether the trial court erred in using the PIA standard to quantify the Tribe's water rights.
- Whether the trial court erred in failing to impose a consumptive-use cap on the awarded water rights (paras 4-5).
Disposition
- The priority date for the Mescalero Apache Tribe's water rights was set at 1852, reversing the trial court's determination of 1873.
- The trial court's use of the PIA standard to quantify the Tribe's water rights was affirmed.
- The trial court's decision not to impose a consumptive-use cap was affirmed (paras 6, 74-75).
Reasons
Majority Opinion (Pickard J., Flores J. concurring):
Priority Date: The court ruled that the 1852 treaty, which promised to establish territorial boundaries for the Mescalero Apache Tribe, effectively created the reservation for purposes of water rights. The court applied liberal principles of treaty interpretation favoring the Tribe, finding that the treaty's intent and subsequent dealings supported a priority date of 1852. The trial court's reliance on the executive orders alone was deemed overly restrictive and inconsistent with federal Indian law principles (paras 10-36).
PIA Standard: The court upheld the trial court's application of the PIA standard, finding that the Tribe failed to prove the economic feasibility of its proposed irrigation projects. The trial court's findings, including unrealistic crop yield projections and inadequate consideration of risks and costs, were supported by substantial evidence. The court rejected the Tribe's arguments regarding the discount rate and the alleged improper reliance on federal guidelines (paras 37-73).
Consumptive-Use Cap: The court affirmed the trial court's decision not to impose a consumptive-use cap, noting that the issue was not properly preserved for appeal (para 8).
Partial Dissent (Donnelly J.):
Donnelly J. agreed with the majority on affirming the trial court's rejection of the Tribe's proposed irrigation projects and the denial of the State's cross-appeal. However, he dissented on the priority date issue, arguing that the 1852 treaty was a peace and amity treaty that did not establish a reservation. He supported the trial court's determination that the priority date should be based on the executive orders (paras 76-91).
Donnelly J. also argued that the Tribe should be recognized as having an aboriginal water right with a priority date of time immemorial for reasonable domestic use, as the evidence supported the Tribe's historical occupation of the reservation lands (paras 92-98).