This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
A Deputy Sheriff, while driving home in her assigned unmarked police vehicle, was involved in a collision with the Plaintiff. The Defendant had left work and stopped briefly at her husband’s workplace before the accident occurred. The Defendant was on call 24/7 and was required to use the vehicle for official purposes, including commuting, as per departmental policy. The Plaintiff filed the lawsuit more than two years after the accident, raising the issue of whether the Defendant was acting within the scope of her duties at the time of the incident (paras 1-8).
Procedural History
- District Court of Dona Ana County: The trial court ruled that the Defendant was acting within the scope of her duties at the time of the accident and granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendant (para 1).
Parties' Submissions
- Plaintiff-Appellant: Argued that the Defendant was not acting within the scope of her duties at the time of the accident, as she was engaged in personal activities, including retrieving an item from her husband’s workplace. The Plaintiff contended that the Defendant’s actions were unrelated to her employment and that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment (paras 1, 23-26).
- Defendant-Appellee: Asserted that she was acting within the scope of her duties as defined by the Tort Claims Act, as she was driving a department-assigned vehicle, was on call, and was required to be available to respond to emergencies. The Defendant emphasized that her use of the vehicle was authorized and consistent with departmental policy (paras 1, 5-7, 11-12).
Legal Issues
- Was the Defendant acting within the scope of her duties under the Tort Claims Act at the time of the accident?
- Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment by concluding that no material factual disputes existed regarding the Defendant’s scope of duties?
Disposition
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the Defendant was acting within the scope of her duties at the time of the accident (para 29).
Reasons
Per Pickard J. (Hartz CJ and Wechsler J. concurring):
The Court analyzed the statutory definition of "scope of duties" under the Tort Claims Act, which includes any duties an employee is requested, required, or authorized to perform, regardless of time or place (para 1). The Court found that the Defendant’s use of the department-assigned vehicle for commuting was authorized by departmental policy, which required her to be on call and available to respond to emergencies while in the vehicle (paras 5-6, 11-12).
The Court distinguished between "scope of duties" under the Tort Claims Act and the common law concept of "scope of employment," noting that the statutory definition is broader. However, the Court also concluded that the Defendant’s actions would satisfy the common law test, as her use of the vehicle was incidental to her employment and furthered the employer’s purpose (paras 9-13).
The Court rejected the Plaintiff’s argument that the Defendant’s brief personal errand (retrieving an item from her husband’s workplace) constituted a substantial deviation from her duties. The Court emphasized that the Defendant was still on duty, as she had not yet arrived home and called in to report her off-duty status, as required by departmental policy (paras 23-25).
The Court concluded that no material factual disputes existed regarding the Defendant’s scope of duties, as the evidence overwhelmingly supported the conclusion that she was acting within the scope of her duties at the time of the accident. The trial court’s grant of summary judgment was therefore appropriate (paras 22-29).