This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
The Defendant was accused of sexually abusing his twelve-year-old stepdaughter over several years, beginning when she was five or six years old. The abuse included multiple instances of sexual penetration and contact. The allegations came to light after the stepdaughter, a runaway at the time, disclosed the abuse to police. The Defendant initially pleaded no contest to related abuse allegations in a separate proceeding but later faced criminal charges after violating the terms of a use immunity order.
Procedural History
- District Court, First Trial: The Defendant’s first trial ended in a mistrial due to prosecutorial misconduct.
- District Court, Second Trial: The Defendant was convicted of five counts of first-degree criminal sexual penetration of a minor (CSPM) and ten counts of third-degree criminal sexual contact of a minor (CSCM).
Parties' Submissions
- Defendant-Appellant: Argued that (1) prosecutorial misconduct in the first trial barred retrial under double jeopardy; (2) identical counts in the indictment and jury instructions violated double jeopardy and due process; (3) there was insufficient evidence to convict on five counts of CSPM; (4) hearsay testimony was improperly admitted; (5) cross-examination of witnesses was improperly limited; and (6) his statements to police should have been suppressed as involuntary.
- State-Appellee: Contended that the second trial was not barred by double jeopardy, the indictment and jury instructions were sufficiently specific, the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, the hearsay testimony was admissible, the cross-examination limitations were proper, and the Defendant’s statements to police were voluntary.
Legal Issues
- Was the Defendant’s second trial barred by double jeopardy due to prosecutorial misconduct in the first trial?
- Did the identical counts in the indictment and jury instructions violate the Defendant’s rights to due process and protection against double jeopardy?
- Was there sufficient evidence to convict the Defendant of five counts of CSPM?
- Did the district court err in admitting hearsay testimony from the SANE nurse?
- Did the district court improperly limit the Defendant’s cross-examination of the victim?
- Were the Defendant’s statements to police involuntary and improperly admitted?
Disposition
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the Defendant’s convictions on all counts.
Reasons
Per Vanzi J. (Fry CJ and Bustamante J. concurring):
Double Jeopardy and Prosecutorial Misconduct: The Court held that the second trial was not barred by double jeopardy. The prosecutor’s misconduct in the first trial was deemed negligent rather than intentional, and the misconduct did not meet the high threshold of willful disregard or intent to provoke a mistrial as required under State v. Breit.
Indictment and Jury Instructions: The Court found that the indictment, supplemented by a bill of particulars, provided sufficient specificity to notify the Defendant of the charges. The jury instructions, while containing identical language for some counts, were tied to specific counts in the indictment, and the evidence supported multiple distinct acts of CSPM. The jury was also instructed that two charges could not arise from the same event, mitigating any double jeopardy concerns.
Sufficiency of Evidence: The Court concluded that the victim’s testimony, corroborated by the Defendant’s own admissions and other evidence, provided substantial evidence to support the five CSPM convictions. The testimony detailed multiple distinct incidents of abuse, satisfying the elements of the charges.
Hearsay Testimony: The Court determined that even if the SANE nurse’s testimony was improperly admitted, any error was harmless. The testimony was cumulative of other evidence, including the Defendant’s admissions, and did not materially affect the outcome of the trial.
Cross-Examination: The Court held that the district court acted within its discretion in limiting cross-examination of the victim regarding speculative behavior of a third party. The limitations did not violate the Defendant’s confrontation rights, as the questioning was deemed irrelevant and potentially prejudicial.
Voluntariness of Statements: The Court upheld the district court’s finding that the Defendant’s statements to police were voluntary. The video evidence showed the Defendant was lucid, coherent, and aware of his rights, and there was no evidence of coercion or exploitation of vulnerabilities by the police.