This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
A worker suffered an accidental injury to her tailbone while at work on August 10, 1990. She claimed that the injury aggravated her preexisting diabetic condition. The worker sought compensation for temporary total disability, medical benefits, and attorney fees (paras 5-6).
Procedural History
- Workers' Compensation Administration, June 16, 1992: Findings of fact and conclusions of law were issued, awarding the worker temporary total disability and medical benefits for the tailbone injury but rejecting her claim that the injury aggravated her diabetic condition (para 5).
- Workers' Compensation Administration, June 25, 1992: A compensation order was issued consistent with the findings of fact and conclusions of law (para 5).
- Workers' Compensation Administration, July 20, 1992: An order was issued awarding attorney fees to the worker (para 6).
Parties' Submissions
- Appellant (Worker): Argued that her motion for attorney fees extended the time for filing an appeal and that the compensation order was not final until the attorney fees were resolved. She also contended that workers' compensation proceedings are sui generis and that the precedent set by Kelly Inn should not apply. Additionally, she argued that Kelly Inn represented a substantial change in the law and should not be applied retroactively to her case (paras 10, 15, and 20).
- Respondents (Employer and Insurer): Argued that the worker's appeal of the compensation order was untimely because the time to appeal began when the compensation order was issued, not when the attorney fees were resolved. They also contended that the workers' compensation judge (WCJ) failed to make findings on the factors considered in determining attorney fees but conceded that they had not requested such findings (paras 2, 4, and 25).
Legal Issues
- Was the worker's appeal of the compensation order untimely because the time to appeal began when the compensation order was issued, despite the pendency of attorney fee proceedings?
- Should the precedent set by Kelly Inn regarding finality of judgments apply to workers' compensation proceedings?
- Did the workers' compensation judge err by failing to make findings on the factors considered in determining attorney fees?
Disposition
- The worker's appeal of the compensation order was dismissed as untimely (para 27).
- The order awarding attorney fees was affirmed (para 27).
Reasons
Per Minzner J. (Pickard and Black JJ. concurring):
- The court held that under Kelly Inn, a compensation order resolving the merits of a case is a final order for purposes of appeal, even if attorney fee proceedings remain pending. The worker's time to appeal began when the compensation order was issued, and her appeal was untimely as it was filed more than 30 days later (paras 2, 9, and 14).
- The court rejected the worker's argument that workers' compensation proceedings are sui generis and that Kelly Inn should not apply. It found that the legislature's use of the term "final order" in Section 52-5-8(A) aligns with the definition of finality established in Kelly Inn (paras 15-19).
- The court declined to exercise discretion to consider the untimely appeal, noting that Kelly Inn had been decided and published months before the compensation order was issued, and the worker could have sought an extension of time to appeal (paras 20-22).
- On the cross-appeal, the court held that the respondents waived their argument regarding the WCJ's failure to make findings on attorney fee factors by not requesting such findings. It also found no statutory requirement for the WCJ to make specific findings on attorney fees in this case (paras 25-26).
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