This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
The Defendant returned to her residence after fighting fires for most of the summer and found two individuals living there with her husband's permission. The individuals had a pickup truck parked in front of the house, which their employer had loaned them. The Defendant allegedly chased the individuals away with an ax and caused over $1,000 in damage to the truck by breaking its windows, windshield, and headlights, and damaging the engine (para 2).
Procedural History
- District Court, Mora County: The court granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of criminal damage to property, holding that the Defendant could only be charged under the specific statute for injuring or tampering with a vehicle (Section 66-3-506) and not under the general statute for criminal damage to property (Section 30-15-1) (headnotes, para 1).
Parties' Submissions
- Plaintiff-Appellant (State of New Mexico): Argued that the general/specific rule was inapplicable and that the Defendant could be charged under the general statute for criminal damage to property (Section 30-15-1) despite the existence of the specific statute for injuring or tampering with a vehicle (Section 66-3-506) (paras 1, 8, 13).
- Defendant-Appellee: Contended that the specific statute (Section 66-3-506) preempted the general statute (Section 30-15-1) and that prosecutorial discretion to charge under either statute violated the Equal Protection Clause (paras 7, 14).
Legal Issues
- Whether the general/specific rule precludes charging the Defendant under the general statute for criminal damage to property (Section 30-15-1) when a specific statute for injuring or tampering with a vehicle (Section 66-3-506) exists.
- Whether prosecutorial discretion to charge under either statute violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Disposition
- The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's dismissal of the criminal damage to property charge and remanded the case for further proceedings (para 21).
Reasons
Per Wechsler J. (Hartz CJ. and Alarid J. concurring):
- The general/specific rule applies only when one statute is entirely subsumed by another. Here, the two statutes include distinct elements: Section 66-3-506 requires proof that the damaged property was a motor vehicle, while Section 30-15-1 requires proof that the damage exceeded $1,000. Since each statute contains an element the other does not, the general/specific rule is inapplicable (paras 8-9).
- The Court found that the statutes are complementary rather than conflicting. Section 66-3-506 addresses minor damage to motor vehicles, while Section 30-15-1 addresses significant damage to any property, including motor vehicles. The legislature did not intend for Section 66-3-506 to preempt the field of motor vehicle damage (paras 10-12).
- Regarding the Equal Protection argument, the Court held that prosecutorial discretion to charge under either statute does not violate the Equal Protection Clause unless exercised discriminatorily. The Defendant did not demonstrate discriminatory prosecution or show that her constitutional rights were violated (paras 14-20).
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