This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
The Defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol for the fourth time, a felony under New Mexico law. After being released on his own recognizance, the Defendant voluntarily entered an inpatient alcohol treatment program. Later, he pleaded guilty to the felony DWI charge and was sentenced to 18 months, with 364 days to be served in jail and the remainder suspended. The trial court granted credit for time spent in the treatment program and allowed a temporary release for post-sentence treatment in a PTSD program (paras 2-5).
Procedural History
- District Court, February 6, 1996: The trial court sentenced the Defendant to 18 months, with 364 days in jail, and granted credit for time spent in an inpatient alcohol treatment program and a post-sentence PTSD treatment program (paras 5-6).
Parties' Submissions
- State (Appellant): Argued that the trial court erred in granting credit for time spent in the inpatient alcohol treatment program, as it did not qualify as "official confinement" under New Mexico law. The State also contended that the post-sentence credit for the PTSD program was improper (paras 7-8, 17).
- Defendant (Appellee): Asserted that time spent in the inpatient alcohol treatment program should be treated as confinement, analogizing it to hospital stays for which credit is allowed. The Defendant also supported the trial court's discretion in granting credit for the PTSD program (paras 8, 14-16).
Legal Issues
- Whether time spent in an inpatient alcohol treatment program qualifies as "official confinement" for presentence credit under New Mexico law.
- Whether the trial court had the discretion to grant credit or an offset for time spent in a post-sentence PTSD treatment program.
Disposition
- The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's grant of presentence credit for the inpatient alcohol treatment program.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's allowance of a post-sentence offset for the PTSD treatment program, treating it as a conditional suspension (paras 21-22).
Reasons
Per Bustamante J. (Bosson and Armijo JJ. concurring):
Presentence Credit: The Court held that the inpatient alcohol treatment program did not qualify as "official confinement" under Section 31-20-12. The Defendant's participation was voluntary, not court-ordered, and lacked the necessary state control or confinement conditions. The Court distinguished this case from precedents like State v. La Badie and State v. Watchman, where confinement was court-mandated or involved state custody (paras 9-16).
Post-Sentence Offset: The Court found that the trial court had discretion to allow a suspension of the sentence conditioned on the Defendant's participation in the PTSD treatment program. This offset did not interfere with the mandatory six-month jail term required by law. The Court emphasized that the trial court's decision was an act of judicial clemency and within its sentencing authority (paras 17-20).
Conclusion: The Court reversed the presentence credit for the alcohol treatment program but affirmed the post-sentence offset for the PTSD program, treating it as a conditional suspension (paras 21-22).