This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
The deceased executed a will dividing his estate between his fiancée and his two minor sons. A provision in the will allowed the fiancée to live in the deceased's residence as long as she remained unmarried and did not cohabit with an unrelated adult male. The sons were also granted the right to live in the residence, provided their mother did not reside there. The provision further stipulated that if these conditions were violated, the residence would be sold, and the proceeds added to the estate's trust.
Procedural History
- District Court, August 16, 1990: The court ruled that the provision in the will regarding the residence was void as against public policy, ordered the residence sold, and directed the proceeds to be distributed under the residuary clause.
- District Court, September 27, 1990: The court disallowed the fiancée's claim against the estate, finding that the provision in the will violated public policy and was void from inception.
Parties' Submissions
- Appellant (Fiancée): Argued that the trial court violated her due process rights by invalidating the will provision without notice or an opportunity to be heard. She also contended that the deceased's intent to benefit her could be achieved without violating public policy.
- Respondents (Sons): Asserted that the provision in the will was void as it violated public policy by conditioning their right to live in the residence on their mother not residing there.
Legal Issues
- Whether the provision in the will regarding the residence violated public policy.
- Whether the deceased's intent to benefit the fiancée could be achieved without violating public policy.
- Whether the fiancée's due process rights were violated when the trial court invalidated the provision without notice or a hearing.
Disposition
- The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for a factual inquiry into the deceased's intent in including the contested provision in the will.
Reasons
Per Black J. (Alarid C.J. and Pickard J. concurring):
The court emphasized that the deceased's intent is paramount in interpreting the will. It noted that the provision's validity depends on whether the deceased's dominant motive was to benefit the fiancée or to promote a separation between the sons and their mother. The court found that the record lacked sufficient evidence to determine the deceased's intent and directed the district court to conduct a factual inquiry. If the deceased's primary intent was to benefit the fiancée, only the portion of the provision affecting the sons' rights during their minority would violate public policy. However, if the primary intent was to separate the sons from their mother, the entire provision would be void.