AI Generated Opinion Summaries

This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

The Defendant, while on parole, was arrested on October 11, 1990, and charged with possession of a controlled substance (methadone) and drug paraphernalia. He spent five days in jail before being released on bond. On December 21, 1990, he was rearrested for violating parole conditions, with the October drug charges forming the basis for the violation. His parole was revoked, and he was incarcerated until May 10, 1991, when he was released and rearrested the same day. The Defendant later pled guilty to possession of drug paraphernalia.

Procedural History

• District Court of Bernalillo County: The Defendant was convicted of possession of drug paraphernalia and sentenced to 364 days in jail without good-time credit. The trial court denied the Defendant's motion for presentence confinement credit for the period between December 21, 1990, and May 10, 1991.

Parties' Submissions

• Defendant-Appellant: Argued that he was entitled to presentence confinement credit for the time spent in custody between December 21, 1990, and May 10, 1991, as this period of incarceration was related to the charges for which he was ultimately convicted.
• Plaintiff-Appellee: Contended that the Defendant was not entitled to presentence confinement credit for this period because his incarceration was due to the revocation of parole on a prior conviction, not the new charges. The Plaintiff relied on the precedent set in Stewart v. State to argue that presentence confinement ends when parole is revoked.

Legal Issues

• Whether the Defendant was entitled to presentence confinement credit for the period of incarceration following the revocation of his parole, which was based on the charges for which he was ultimately convicted.

Disposition

• The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for resentencing, allowing the trial court to exercise its discretion in determining whether the Defendant should receive presentence confinement credit for the disputed period.

Reasons

Per Alarid CJ (Donnelly and Minzner JJ. concurring):

The Court held that under NMSA 1978, Section 31-20-12, a Defendant is entitled to presentence confinement credit if the confinement is related to the charges for which the Defendant is ultimately sentenced, even if the confinement is not exclusively related to those charges. The Court distinguished the present case from Stewart v. State, clarifying that the statement in Stewart regarding the end of presentence confinement upon parole revocation was limited to its specific facts, where consecutive sentences had been imposed.

The Court applied the three-part test from State v. Facteau and State v. Orona to determine whether presentence confinement credit was appropriate. It found that the Defendant's incarceration after his parole revocation was sufficiently connected to the drug paraphernalia charges, as the parole violation was based on those charges, and a bench warrant was issued shortly after his rearrest. The Court also interpreted Section 31-18-21(B) as granting the sentencing judge discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for crimes committed while on parole, further supporting the trial court's authority to award presentence confinement credit.

The Court concluded that the trial court had discretion to award presentence confinement credit for the disputed period and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of this clarification.