This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
The Plaintiff, a Wisconsin corporation, sought a refund for motor transportation fees paid to the New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department. The Department partially denied the refund claim, asserting that the Plaintiff failed to file its complaint within the statutory 90-day period following the mailing of the denial notice. The Plaintiff argued that the filing period should begin upon delivery of the notice, not its mailing (paras 2-3).
Procedural History
- District Court of Santa Fe County: The court dismissed the Plaintiff's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the Plaintiff failed to file within the statutory 90-day period following the mailing of the denial notice (paras 6-7).
Parties' Submissions
- Appellant (Plaintiff): Argued that the statutory filing period should begin upon delivery of the denial notice, not its mailing. The Plaintiff also contended that the Department's evidence of mailing was insufficient and that the Department should not benefit from a presumption of mailing based on its internal practices (paras 5, 8, 13).
- Appellees (Defendants): Asserted that the statutory filing period begins upon mailing of the denial notice, as per the statute. They supported their position with affidavits detailing the Department's routine mailing practices and evidence that the Plaintiff received the refund warrants included with the denial notice (paras 3-4, 9, 13).
Legal Issues
- Does the statutory filing period under NMSA 1978, Section 7-1-26(B)(1), begin upon the mailing or delivery of a denial notice?
- Was the Department's evidence of mailing sufficient to support summary judgment?
- Did the district court err in granting summary judgment based on the Department's evidence of mailing?
Disposition
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Plaintiff's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (para 25).
Reasons
Per Wechsler J. (Pickard and Sutin JJ. concurring):
Statutory Interpretation: The Court held that the statutory filing period under Section 7-1-26(B)(1) begins upon the mailing of the denial notice, not its delivery. The statute's use of "mailing or delivery" in the disjunctive indicates that mailing and delivery are alternative methods of providing notice. Interpreting the statute to require filing within 90 days of mailing avoids rendering the "mailing" language superfluous (paras 9-10).
Constitutionality: The Court rejected the Plaintiff's argument that the statute is unconstitutionally vague. Established rules of statutory construction allowed the Court to discern the legislative intent, making the statute sufficiently clear (para 11).
Evidence of Mailing: The Court found that the Department presented sufficient circumstantial evidence of mailing through affidavits detailing its routine mailing practices. The affidavits established that the denial notices were prepared, deposited in the office mailbox, and processed for mailing on December 15 or 16, 2003. The Plaintiff's receipt of the refund warrants included with the notices corroborated this evidence (paras 13-23).
Summary Judgment: The Court concluded that the Department made a prima facie case for summary judgment by demonstrating that the notices were mailed more than 90 days before the Plaintiff filed its complaint. The Plaintiff failed to present evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact regarding the date of mailing. Therefore, summary judgment was appropriate (paras 16-24).