This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
The Defendant was arrested in October 1993 for possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia after police stopped his vehicle based on an informant's tip and subsequent investigation. During the stop, the Defendant resisted a pat-down search, leading to the discovery of methamphetamine in his waistband (paras 3, 17-28).
Procedural History
- District Court, December 27, 1994: Denied the Defendant's motions to suppress evidence and dismiss charges based on alleged violations of the six-month rule and constitutional speedy trial rights (paras 1, 6).
Parties' Submissions
- Defendant-Appellant: Argued that the six-month rule under Rule 5-604 was violated, as no written or oral agreement to waive the rule existed. Additionally, claimed his constitutional right to a speedy trial was infringed and that the stop, search, and seizure violated his Fourth Amendment rights (paras 2, 5, 8-9, 18-19).
- Plaintiff-Appellee: Contended that the Defendant orally agreed to waive the six-month rule during plea negotiations and that the delay was justified. Further argued that the stop and search were based on reasonable suspicion, which ripened into probable cause due to the Defendant's actions during the stop (paras 5, 11-12, 19-28).
Legal Issues
- Was the six-month rule under Rule 5-604 violated, and did the Defendant waive his rights under this rule?
- Was the Defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial infringed?
- Was the stop, search, and seizure of the Defendant's person and vehicle lawful under the Fourth Amendment?
Disposition
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the six-month rule was not violated, the Defendant's constitutional speedy trial rights were not infringed, and the stop, search, and seizure were lawful (paras 1, 29-30).
Reasons
Per Benny E. Flores J. (Hartz CJ. and Bustamante J. concurring):
Six-Month Rule: The Court found that plea negotiations alone do not suspend the six-month rule under Rule 5-604. However, the trial court's findings on remand established that the Defendant's attorney orally agreed to a plea and indicated that scheduling the plea hearing after the six-month period was "no problem." This constituted a waiver of the six-month rule (paras 7-12).
Constitutional Speedy Trial: Applying the four-factor test from Barker v. Wingo, the Court determined:
- The twelve-month delay was presumptively prejudicial (para 14).
- The reasons for the delay were largely attributable to the Defendant, including his agreement to a later plea hearing and his request to reschedule the July 25 hearing (paras 15-16).
- The Defendant did not assert his speedy trial rights until September 29, 1994, weighing against him (para 15).
- No significant prejudice to the Defendant was demonstrated, as he was not incarcerated pretrial, and his defense was not compromised (para 15). On balance, the Court concluded there was no violation of the Defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial (paras 13-16).
Stop, Search, and Seizure:
- Reasonable Suspicion for Stop: The informant's tip, corroborated by police investigation and surveillance, provided reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant's vehicle. Although the trial court incorrectly applied the Gates test, the stop was valid under New Mexico's Bedolla and Flores standards (paras 19-21).
- Protective Frisk: The officers' observations of the Defendant's behavior, combined with their knowledge of methamphetamine-related dangers, justified the pat-down search for weapons (paras 22-25).
- Probable Cause and Exigent Circumstances: The Defendant's actions during the frisk, including producing a syringe, provided probable cause and exigent circumstances for a warrantless search and seizure of methamphetamine from his waistband (paras 27-28).
The Court affirmed the trial court's rulings on all issues (paras 29-30).