This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
The Defendant, employed at a healthcare facility receiving Medicaid payments, was accused of committing criminal sexual offenses against a female patient. The case involved the appointment of an attorney from the Medicaid Providers Fraud Control Unit (MPFCU) as a special assistant district attorney to prosecute the matter (paras 2, 4).
Procedural History
- District Court: The Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing lack of jurisdiction due to improper appointment of the prosecutor. The motion was denied. The Defendant entered into an agreement to reduce the charge to attempted criminal sexual penetration in the third degree, reserving the right to appeal the jurisdictional issue. The court found the Defendant guilty based on stipulated facts (paras 5-6).
Parties' Submissions
- Defendant-Appellant: Argued that the appointment of the MPFCU attorney as a special assistant district attorney was unauthorized under New Mexico law, as there was no ethical reason or good cause preventing the district attorney from prosecuting the case (paras 7, 11).
- Plaintiff-Appellee: Contended that the appointment was valid under general statutory provisions allowing district attorneys to appoint assistants and that the title "special assistant" was not determinative of the appointment's validity (paras 8-9).
Legal Issues
- Whether the appointment of an MPFCU attorney as a special assistant district attorney to prosecute the case was authorized under New Mexico law.
Disposition
- The Defendant's conviction was reversed, and the matter was remanded with instructions to dismiss the indictment (para 15).
Reasons
Per Bivins J. (Hartz and Chavez JJ. concurring):
The court held that the appointment of the MPFCU attorney was unauthorized under New Mexico law. While general statutes allow district attorneys to appoint assistants, the specific statute governing the appointment of special assistants for individual cases (Section 36-1-23.1) requires ethical reasons or other good cause for such appointments. The state conceded that no such reasons existed in this case (paras 7, 11).
The court emphasized principles of statutory construction, holding that specific statutes take precedence over general ones. Allowing the appointment under general statutes would render the specific statute governing special appointments meaningless. The court also distinguished the state's reliance on out-of-state cases, finding them inapplicable (paras 10-13).
The court noted that while budgetary constraints or heavy caseloads might constitute "good cause" for appointing special prosecutors, the state did not argue this point. The Defendant's conviction was reversed due to the lack of authority for the prosecutor's appointment (paras 14-15).