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Decision Information

Citations - New Mexico Laws and Court Rules
Rule Set 1 - Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts - cited by 4,845 documents

Decision Content

This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

A veterinarian treated a horse named Eagle following surgeries at Colorado State University. After complications arose, the veterinarian performed surgery, but the horse was euthanized the next day due to its condition. The horse's owner filed a complaint with the New Mexico Board of Veterinary Medicine, alleging malpractice and cruelty (paras 2-3).

Procedural History

  • Hearing Officer Decision: Found that the Board could not discipline the veterinarian for ordinary negligence under Section 61-14-13(A)(5) of the Veterinary Practice Act (VPA) but determined the veterinarian committed negligent, grossly negligent, and cruel acts (para 5).
  • New Mexico Board of Veterinary Medicine Decision: Disagreed with the hearing officer, asserting authority to discipline for ordinary negligence and imposing sanctions, including probation, continuing education, and $22,021.83 in costs (paras 5-6).
  • District Court Decision: Held that the Board could not discipline for ordinary negligence under Section 61-14-13(A)(5) and reduced the costs to $1,923.06, finding that costs should align with Rule 1-054(D) NMRA (paras 7-8).

Parties' Submissions

  • Appellant-Respondent (Veterinarian): Argued that the Board lacked authority to discipline for ordinary negligence and that the costs assessed were excessive and improperly calculated (paras 7-9, 18-20).
  • Appellee-Petitioner (Board): Contended that "other malpractice" under Section 61-14-13(A)(5) includes ordinary negligence and that costs under Section 61-1-4(G) are not limited by Rule 1-054(D) NMRA (paras 5, 18-20).

Legal Issues

  • Whether the Board of Veterinary Medicine can discipline a licensee for acts of ordinary negligence under Section 61-14-13(A)(5) of the VPA.
  • Whether the costs assessed against the veterinarian under Section 61-1-4(G) of the Uniform Licensing Act (ULA) are limited by Rule 1-054(D) NMRA.

Disposition

  • The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's ruling that the Board cannot discipline for ordinary negligence under Section 61-14-13(A)(5) of the VPA (para 39).
  • The Court reversed the district court's disallowance of certain costs, holding that Rule 1-054(D) does not limit costs under Section 61-1-4(G) of the ULA, and remanded for further consideration (para 39).
  • The Court was divided on whether the Board members' per diem and mileage could be assessed as costs, with the majority allowing it and the dissent opposing (paras 39-44).

Reasons

Per Kennedy J. (Pickard and Sutin JJ. concurring in part):

  • Ordinary Negligence: The Court held that Section 61-14-13(A)(5) of the VPA does not authorize discipline for ordinary negligence during a single episode of treatment. Including ordinary negligence would render the term "gross negligence" superfluous and impose a higher standard on veterinarians than on other healthcare professionals (paras 10-17).
  • Costs Assessment: The Court found that Rule 1-054(D) NMRA does not limit costs under Section 61-1-4(G) of the ULA, as the statute explicitly requires licensees to bear all costs of disciplinary proceedings. The district court erred in applying Rule 1-054(D) to exclude certain costs, such as the hearing room and expert witness fees (paras 18-27).
  • Stenographic Costs: The Court upheld the Board's decision to use a stenographer instead of a tape recorder, finding it was not arbitrary or capricious given the complexity and length of the hearing (paras 31-32).

Per Pickard J. (Sutin J. concurring):

  • Per Diem and Mileage: The majority held that the Board members' per diem and mileage could be assessed as costs under Section 61-1-4(G) of the ULA. The costs associated with disciplinary proceedings are distinct from regular Board expenses and are appropriately charged to the disciplined veterinarian (paras 41-44).

Per Kennedy J., dissenting in part:

  • Per Diem and Mileage: Kennedy J. dissented on this issue, arguing that per diem and mileage are ordinary Board expenses funded by license fees under Section 61-14-4(E) of the VPA and should not be assessed as costs against a disciplined veterinarian. Allowing such costs could lead to double-charging and absurd results (paras 33-38).
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