AI Generated Opinion Summaries

This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

A minor, Gabriel M., was adjudicated a delinquent child for arson and intimidation of witnesses. While working at K-Mart, Gabriel set fire to a rack of clothing, damaging merchandise but not the building structure. He later made a threatening statement to two co-workers, which influenced their initial reluctance to provide full information during the investigation (paras 2-6).

Procedural History

• District Court of Chaves County: Gabriel M. was adjudicated a delinquent child for arson, intimidation of witnesses, and tampering with evidence. He was sentenced to two years of probation and ordered to pay restitution for the damaged goods (paras 7, headnotes).

Parties' Submissions

• Appellant (Gabriel M.): Argued that the arson statute does not apply to personal property like merchandise and that there was insufficient evidence to prove intimidation of witnesses. He also contended that the intimidation statute should not apply to juveniles who cannot be convicted of felonies (paras 8-9, 22, 27).
• Respondent (State of New Mexico): Asserted that the arson statute includes personal property and that Gabriel's actions met the statutory requirements. The State also argued that the intimidation statute applies to juveniles and that sufficient evidence supported the intimidation adjudication (paras 9, 18, 27).

Legal Issues

• Does the arson statute, NMSA 1978, § 30-17-5, apply to the burning of personal property such as merchandise?
• Was there sufficient evidence to support the adjudication for intimidation of witnesses?
• Can a juvenile be adjudicated for intimidation of witnesses under NMSA 1978, § 30-24-3, when the offense involves the possible commission of a felony?

Disposition

• The adjudication for arson was reversed.
• The restitution order based on the arson adjudication was reversed.
• The adjudications for intimidation of witnesses were affirmed (paras 21, 34, 36).

Reasons

Per Sutin J. (Wechsler and Castillo JJ. concurring):

• Arson Statute Interpretation: The court found that the arson statute does not apply to personal property like merchandise. The statutory language and legislative history indicate that "property of another" refers to structures or fixtures, not personal property. The court applied the rules of statutory construction, including ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis, and the rule of lenity, to conclude that Gabriel's actions did not constitute arson (paras 10-21).

• Intimidation of Witnesses: The court held that sufficient evidence supported the adjudication for intimidation of witnesses. Gabriel's statement to his co-workers and their initial reluctance to provide full information due to his presence demonstrated intent to intimidate. The court also rejected Gabriel's argument that the intimidation statute does not apply to juveniles, reasoning that the statute concerns the nature of the offense, not the adjudicatory scheme. The intimidation statute applies if the conduct could result in a felony charge, regardless of whether the juvenile can be convicted of a felony (paras 22-34).

• Restitution: The restitution order was reversed because it was based on the arson adjudication, which was overturned (para 35).