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Facts

The case concerns a groundwater discharge permit issued by the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) to Phelps Dodge Tyrone, Inc. for its Tyrone copper mine. The permit imposed conditions requiring the regrading of waste rock and leach ore piles to a 3:1 slope and capping them with three feet of non-acid generating material to prevent acid drainage, which can contaminate groundwater for hundreds of years. Phelps Dodge Tyrone challenged these conditions, arguing they were overly burdensome and beyond NMED's authority under the Water Quality Act (paras 2, 4-7).

Procedural History

  • New Mexico Water Quality Control Commission: Upheld the permit conditions imposed by NMED (para 2).
  • Certiorari Denied: New Mexico Supreme Court denied certiorari on September 5 and September 11, 2006.

Parties' Submissions

  • Appellant (Phelps Dodge Tyrone, Inc.): Argued that NMED lacked authority under the Water Quality Act to impose specific methods for pollution control, claiming the conditions were invalid and overly burdensome. It also proposed an alternative method, the "open-pit capture zone," which it argued was less onerous and sufficient to address contamination. Additionally, it raised due process concerns regarding the composition and conduct of the Commission (paras 2, 8, 12-14, 26, 39).
  • Respondents (NMED and New Mexico Water Quality Control Commission): Asserted that the Water Quality Act granted NMED authority to impose reasonable permit conditions to prevent water pollution. They defended the conditions as necessary to prevent acid drainage and argued that the Commission's decision was supported by substantial evidence and complied with the law (paras 14-15, 19-20, 30).

Legal Issues

  • Did NMED have the authority under the Water Quality Act to impose specific permit conditions for pollution control?
  • Were the permit conditions reasonable and lawful?
  • Did the Commission's decision violate the Appellant's due process rights?

Disposition

  • NMED has the authority to impose reasonable permit conditions under the Water Quality Act.
  • The Commission's method for determining the reasonableness of the conditions was flawed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings on this issue.
  • The Appellant's due process claims were rejected (paras 3, 58-59).

Reasons

Per Wechsler J. (Alarid and Castillo JJ. concurring):

  • Authority of NMED: The court held that NMED has statutory authority under Section 74-6-5(D) of the Water Quality Act to impose reasonable permit conditions. The Act allows flexibility in addressing site-specific pollution issues, distinguishing between general regulations and site-specific permits. The court rejected the Appellant's argument that NMED could only impose conditions related to monitoring and reporting (paras 11-24).

  • Reasonableness of Conditions: The court found that the Commission's determination that the entire mine site was a "place of withdrawal of water for present or reasonably foreseeable future use" was overly broad and impractical. The Commission failed to establish clear factors or policies to guide its decision-making. The case was remanded for the Commission to develop appropriate standards and reconsider the reasonableness of the conditions (paras 25-38).

  • Due Process Claims: The court rejected the Appellant's claims of bias and procedural unfairness. It found no evidence that Commissioner Goad or Commissioner Lewis acted with bias or prejudged the case. The changes in the Commission's composition and the alleged undue influence of NMED's Cabinet Secretary did not violate due process, as there was no demonstrated prejudice or unfairness in the proceedings (paras 39-57).

The court emphasized the need for a balanced approach that protects water resources while imposing reasonable requirements on industry (paras 29-30, 33).

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