This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
The Defendant was charged with aggravated driving while under the influence (second offense), concealing identification, and improper backing. After being arraigned, the Defendant failed to appear at a pretrial conference, leading to the issuance of a bench warrant. The Defendant later appeared voluntarily, paid a $100 bench warrant fee, and the warrant was quashed. A jury trial was subsequently scheduled within 182 days of the Defendant’s failure to appear but not within 182 days of the arraignment.
Procedural History
- Magistrate Court: Denied the Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of timely prosecution and accepted a conditional plea.
- District Court: Affirmed the magistrate court’s decision, holding that the payment of the bench warrant fee constituted a triggering event under Rule 6-506(B)(5) and remanded the case for imposition of the original sentence.
Parties' Submissions
- Defendant-Appellant: Argued that the State failed to bring the case to trial within the 182-day period required under Rule 6-506(B). Contended that his voluntary appearance and payment of the bench warrant fee did not constitute a “surrender” under Rule 6-506(B)(5) and that the time period should have commenced from the date of arraignment.
- State-Appellee: Asserted that the Defendant’s payment of the bench warrant fee and voluntary appearance constituted a “surrender” under Rule 6-506(B)(5), restarting the 182-day period from the date of the Defendant’s failure to appear.
Legal Issues
- Whether the Defendant’s voluntary appearance and payment of a bench warrant fee constituted a “surrender” under Rule 6-506(B)(5), thereby restarting the 182-day period for trial.
Disposition
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the Defendant’s actions constituted a “surrender” under Rule 6-506(B)(5) and that the trial was timely.
Reasons
Per Sutin J. (Bustamante and Vigil JJ. concurring):
The Court applied a de novo standard of review to the interpretation of Rule 6-506. It distinguished the case from State v. Granado, where no bench warrant was issued, and the defendant’s appearance did not constitute a “surrender.” Here, a bench warrant was issued, and the Defendant’s voluntary appearance and payment of the $100 fee to quash the warrant constituted a submission to legal authority, satisfying the definition of “surrender” under Rule 6-506(B)(5). The Court rejected the Defendant’s argument that this interpretation was contrary to the rule’s language, emphasizing that the issuance of the warrant and subsequent quashing were sufficient to restart the 182-day period from the date of the Defendant’s failure to appear.