This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
The Defendant was accused of molesting a five-year-old child on September 24, 2002. The child reported the incident to her mother, who contacted the police. The Defendant was questioned late at night, given Miranda warnings, and signed a waiver of rights. During the interview, which lasted one to two hours, the Defendant confessed to one incident of molestation (paras 2-3).
Procedural History
- District Court, August 7, 2003: The trial court declared a mistrial due to defense counsel's remarks during jury selection, which were deemed to have tainted the jury pool (paras 4-5).
- Court of Appeals, February 5, 2004: The Defendant filed an appeal challenging the mistrial order but later withdrew the appeal. The Court of Appeals issued a mandate on February 20, 2004 (paras 6-7).
Parties' Submissions
- Defendant-Appellant: Argued that his confession was involuntary due to fatigue, police deception about physical evidence, and promises of leniency. He also contended that the mistrial was improperly declared, violating the six-month rule for trial commencement, and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to try him while his appeal of the mistrial order was pending (paras 9-10, 22-23, 31).
- Plaintiff-Appellee: Asserted that the confession was voluntary, the mistrial was properly declared, and the six-month rule was reset by the mistrial order. The Plaintiff also argued that the trial court retained jurisdiction despite the pending appeal (paras 9, 22, 31).
Legal Issues
- Was the Defendant's confession voluntary?
- Did the mistrial declaration improperly extend the six-month rule for trial commencement?
- Did the trial court have jurisdiction to try the Defendant while his appeal of the mistrial order was pending?
Disposition
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decisions, holding that the confession was voluntary, the six-month rule was properly reset by the mistrial order, and the trial court retained jurisdiction to try the Defendant (para 43).
Reasons
Per Pickard J. (Alarid and Wechsler JJ. concurring):
Voluntariness of Confession:
The Court held that the confession was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances. The Defendant's fatigue did not impair his ability to understand or respond during the interview. The officer's statements about physical evidence were not deceptive, and the references to treatment did not constitute promises of leniency. The Defendant's will was not overborne, and the confession was admissible (paras 9-21).
Six-Month Rule:
The Court ruled that the mistrial order reset the six-month period for trial commencement under Rule 5-604(B). Even if the mistrial was improperly declared, the rule's plain language and policy considerations supported restarting the timeline. The Defendant's participation in pretrial proceedings without timely objection further undermined his argument (paras 22-30).
Jurisdiction During Appeal:
The Court found that the trial court retained jurisdiction because the Defendant's appeal of the mistrial order was not properly before the appellate court. The mistrial order was not a final judgment, and the Defendant failed to meet procedural requirements for interlocutory appeal. Additionally, the appellate proceedings were effectively concluded before the trial began (paras 31-42).