AI Generated Opinion Summaries

This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

The Defendant was sentenced to incarceration, with all but one year suspended, followed by a two-year probation period to run consecutively to a two-year parole period. After being released on parole in February 1991, the Defendant's parole was revoked in September 1992. The Defendant admitted to parole and probation violations and agreed to enter a one-year residential drug treatment program. In February 1994, the State moved to revoke the Defendant's probation, but the Defendant argued that his probationary term had already expired (paras 2-4).

Procedural History

• District Court of Colfax County: The trial court revoked the Defendant's probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his probation period in the penitentiary until February 1995 (para 5).

Parties' Submissions

• Defendant-Appellant: Argued that under NMSA 1978, Section 31-20-5(B), the time served on parole should be credited toward the probation period. The Defendant claimed that his probationary term had expired before the State moved to revoke it in January 1994 (para 4).
• Plaintiff-Appellee (State): Contended that Section 31-20-5(B) was a default provision applicable only when the judgment and sentence were not specific. The State argued that the judgment explicitly stated that the probation period was to run consecutively to the parole term, and thus no credit for parole time was warranted (para 5).

Legal Issues

• Whether the Defendant's probationary term had expired before the State initiated revocation proceedings.
• Whether NMSA 1978, Section 31-20-5(B), requires credit for time served on parole toward a probation period, even when the judgment specifies that probation is to run consecutively to parole.

Disposition

• The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for the Defendant's release (para 13).

Reasons

Per Flores J. (Alarid and Pickard JJ. concurring):

• The Court found that NMSA 1978, Section 31-20-5(B), clearly and unambiguously requires that time served on parole be credited toward a probation period when probation follows incarceration. The statute does not indicate that it is a default provision applicable only in cases where the judgment is silent (paras 6-7).
• The Court emphasized that the statutory language must be given effect unless it is ambiguous or leads to an absurd result. Here, the plain meaning of the statute aligns with the legislative intent to allow credit for parole time, as both parole and probation involve supervision by the Department of Corrections (paras 6-8).
• The Court rejected the State's argument that the "new" probation imposed in October 1992 negated the requirement to credit parole time. The Court held that the trial court lacked authority to extend the probation period beyond the statutory limits (paras 12-13).
• The Court concluded that the Defendant's probationary term had expired before the State moved to revoke it in January 1994, rendering the revocation invalid (para 13).