This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
The Defendant was charged with multiple offenses, including aggravated DWI, driving with a suspended or revoked license, reckless driving, and operating an uninsured motor vehicle. The charges stemmed from an incident where the Defendant allegedly crashed a truck into a parked vehicle and fled the scene. He was later found hiding in a field and refused to cooperate with police, including declining to answer questions or perform field sobriety tests (paras 2-3).
Procedural History
- District Court, May 1997: A mistrial was declared after the prosecutor improperly commented on the Defendant's post-arrest silence during the opening statement. The court subsequently dismissed the charges, ruling that retrial was barred under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the New Mexico Constitution (paras 4-6).
Parties' Submissions
- Appellant (State): Argued that the trial court erred in barring retrial, asserting that the prosecutor's comments, while improper, did not meet the standard of "willful disregard" or intent to provoke a mistrial under the test established in State v. Breit (paras 7-8, 12).
- Appellee (Defendant): Contended that the prosecutor's comments on his post-arrest silence constituted prosecutorial misconduct, which warranted the mistrial and barred retrial under the Double Jeopardy Clause (paras 7, 13).
Legal Issues
- Whether the prosecutor's comments on the Defendant's post-arrest silence constituted misconduct sufficient to bar retrial under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the New Mexico Constitution.
Disposition
- The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision to bar retrial and remanded the case for further proceedings (para 17).
Reasons
Per Donnelly J. (Alarid and Wechsler JJ. concurring):
The Court applied the three-part test from State v. Breit to determine whether retrial was barred under the Double Jeopardy Clause. The test requires: (1) improper official conduct that is unfairly prejudicial and cannot be cured by a mistrial, (2) knowledge by the official that the conduct is improper and prejudicial, and (3) intent to provoke a mistrial or willful disregard of the resulting mistrial (para 8).
The Court found that while the prosecutor's comments on the Defendant's post-arrest silence were improper and warranted a mistrial, they did not meet the third prong of the Breit test. Specifically, there was no evidence that the prosecutor intended to provoke a mistrial or acted with willful disregard of the consequences. The trial court's presumption of willful misconduct was deemed overly broad (paras 10-12).
The Court emphasized that barring retrial under the Double Jeopardy Clause is an "exceedingly uncommon remedy" and should only apply in exceptional cases. The prosecutor's prompt acknowledgment of error and the lack of evidence suggesting a strategic benefit from the mistrial further supported the conclusion that retrial was not barred (paras 14-15).
The Court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the charges with prejudice but noted that appropriate sanctions against the prosecutor could be imposed on remand if warranted (para 16).