This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
The Defendant pled guilty to two counts of criminal sexual penetration of a minor under the age of 13. He was sentenced to 18 years of incarceration on each count, to run concurrently, but the sentence was suspended, and he was placed on supervised probation for 5 to 20 years. A condition of his probation required successful completion of inpatient sex offender and substance abuse treatment if recommended by his probation officer. The Defendant was admitted to the STOP program but was terminated after admitting to consuming alcohol, a violation of program rules.
Procedural History
- District Court, Rio Arriba County: The Defendant's probation was revoked, and he was sentenced to 18 years in prison, with all but 5 years suspended, followed by an indeterminate probation term of 5 to 20 years.
Parties' Submissions
- Appellant (Defendant): Argued that he had a protected liberty interest in remaining in the STOP program and that his termination without a hearing violated his due process rights. He claimed the program was effectively a diversionary sentencing scheme, entitling him to procedural safeguards similar to those in diversionary programs like drug court.
- Appellee (State): Contended that the Defendant had no protected liberty interest in the STOP program and that his due process rights were not violated because he was afforded a probation revocation hearing where he could challenge his termination.
Legal Issues
- Did the Defendant have a protected liberty interest in remaining in the STOP program, entitling him to due process before termination?
- Were the Defendant's due process rights violated by his termination from the STOP program without a hearing?
Disposition
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the revocation of the Defendant's probation and the imposition of his sentence.
Reasons
Per Kennedy J. (Sutin and Vigil JJ. concurring):
The Court held that the Defendant did not have a protected liberty interest in remaining in the STOP program. The program was not a diversionary sentencing scheme, and the Defendant had not engaged in a quid-pro-quo bargaining process for his placement in the program. The Court distinguished the STOP program from the preprosecution diversion program (PPD), which is the only recognized diversionary program in New Mexico.
The Court found that the Defendant was afforded all the due process required under the law. He was entitled to, and did, challenge his termination from the STOP program during the probation revocation hearing. The trial court considered evidence and testimony from both parties and found that the Defendant violated his probation by consuming alcohol, which was a condition for remaining in the program.
The Court rejected the Defendant's reliance on out-of-state authority and prior New Mexico case law, finding them inapplicable. It emphasized that the Defendant's probation conditions and the STOP program referral did not create a protected liberty interest or entitle him to additional procedural safeguards beyond those provided at the probation revocation hearing.