This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
The Defendant, a bookkeeper for a property management company (RMS), was responsible for handling rental payments, preparing deposit slips, and reconciling accounts. Over $3,000 in rental payments went missing, prompting an investigation. The Defendant admitted to taking the money during a polygraph test and provided a written confession (paras 2-3).
Procedural History
- District Court of Bernalillo County: The Defendant was convicted of seven counts of embezzlement, including two misdemeanors and five fourth-degree felonies.
Parties' Submissions
- Defendant-Appellant: Argued that the single larceny doctrine should apply, reducing the charges to one count of third-degree felony embezzlement. Additionally, the Defendant challenged the admissibility of his confession, the cross-examination of his wife, the sufficiency of evidence regarding entrustment, the jury instructions on entrustment, and the restitution order to the insurance company (paras 1, 4, 11, 17, 21, 25).
- Plaintiff-Appellee: Contended that the Defendant's actions constituted separate embezzlements due to distinct dates, clients, and amounts. The Plaintiff also argued that the confession was admissible, the cross-examination of the Defendant's wife was proper, sufficient evidence supported entrustment, and the restitution order was authorized by statute (paras 7-10, 15-16, 19, 23, 28).
Legal Issues
- Does the single larceny doctrine apply to the Defendant's actions, warranting a single charge of embezzlement?
- Was the cross-examination of the Defendant's wife regarding uncharged allegations of misconduct improper?
- Was the Defendant's confession improperly admitted due to the private investigator's alleged status as a state agent?
- Did the State provide sufficient evidence to prove entrustment?
- Was the trial court required to provide a jury instruction defining "entrustment"?
- Was the restitution order to the insurance company authorized by statute?
Disposition
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the Defendant's conviction on seven counts of embezzlement and upheld the restitution order to the insurance company (paras 10, 29, 31).
Reasons
Majority Opinion (Alarid J., Flores J. concurring):
Single Larceny Doctrine: The Court held that the single larceny doctrine did not apply because the embezzlements occurred on separate dates, involved different clients, and reflected distinct intents. The prosecutor was entitled to charge separate counts for each act (paras 7-10).
Cross-Examination of Defendant's Wife: The Court found the cross-examination permissible under evidentiary rules, as it involved questioning the witness about her own alleged misconduct without introducing extrinsic evidence. Any error was deemed harmless given the substantial evidence supporting the conviction (paras 11-16).
Confession Admissibility: The Court rejected the argument that the private investigator was a state agent, finding no evidence of state control or involvement. Additionally, the Defendant's appellate argument on this issue was not properly preserved at trial (paras 17-20).
Entrustment: The Court determined that sufficient evidence supported the finding of entrustment, as the Defendant was responsible for handling and depositing the rental money. No special jury instruction on "entrustment" was required, as the term carried its ordinary meaning (paras 21-24).
Restitution: The Court upheld the restitution order, reasoning that the insurance company, having paid the claim, was a "victim" under the statute and entitled to restitution. The purpose of restitution includes holding the Defendant accountable for the costs of his misconduct (paras 25-29).
Dissenting Opinion (Bivins J.):
Bivins J. dissented on the application of the single larceny doctrine, arguing that the jury should have been instructed to determine whether the Defendant's actions reflected a single, continuous intent or multiple independent intents. He proposed a jury instruction to address this issue and would have reversed and remanded for a new trial on this basis (paras 33-46).