This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
The Defendant entered into a plea agreement for two separate incidents of driving while intoxicated (DWI) that occurred on September 2, 2007, and May 22, 2008. The Defendant had three prior DWI convictions. The plea agreement did not include any sentencing agreements but listed the potential penalties for each offense, which could range from a fourth to a seventh DWI conviction. The district court sentenced the Defendant to 18 months for one count and two years for the other, treating the offenses as a fourth and fifth DWI conviction, respectively (paras 1-2).
Procedural History
- District Court of San Juan County: The Defendant was convicted of two DWI offenses and sentenced to 18 months for one count and two years for the other, based on the statutory penalties for a fourth and fifth DWI conviction (paras 1-2).
Parties' Submissions
- Defendant-Appellant: Argued that because the two DWI convictions were entered simultaneously in one judgment, neither could be considered a "prior" conviction for sentencing purposes. The Defendant claimed that the district court erred in sentencing him for a fourth and fifth DWI conviction under the statute, as the statutory language was ambiguous in this context (paras 3-4).
- Plaintiff-Appellee: [Not applicable or not found]
Legal Issues
- Whether the statutory language regarding DWI sentencing is ambiguous when two convictions are entered simultaneously in one judgment.
- Whether the district court erred in sentencing the Defendant for a fourth and fifth DWI conviction under the circumstances.
Disposition
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment and sentence imposed by the district court (para 7).
Reasons
Per Sutin J. (Castillo and Garcia JJ. concurring):
The Court found that the statutory language in NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-102(E)-(J) (2007) is clear and unambiguous. The statute specifies the penalties for each DWI conviction, including a "fourth conviction" and a "fifth conviction," without requiring that one conviction be entered before the other to qualify as "prior" (paras 4-5). The Defendant's plea agreement acknowledged two separate DWI offenses, and the State demonstrated three prior convictions. Therefore, the district court correctly sentenced the Defendant under the statutory provisions for a fourth and fifth conviction (paras 5-6).
The Court rejected the Defendant's argument that combining two DWI offenses in one judgment should result in only one conviction for sentencing purposes, noting that the Defendant provided no supporting authority for this claim. The Court also distinguished the DWI sentencing statute from habitual offender statutes, emphasizing that DWI sentencing is tied to the number of convictions, not the sequence in which they are entered (paras 5-6).