This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
The Defendant was charged with multiple counts of criminal sexual penetration of a minor (CSPM) involving his step-son. The victim alleged that the abuse occurred over several years, starting when he was seven years old, in various locations, including a truck and at home. The Defendant denied all allegations, claiming the victim was untruthful and influenced by his grandmother (paras 2, 4-5).
Procedural History
- District Court of San Juan County: The Defendant was convicted on two counts of CSPM and sentenced to two consecutive eighteen-year terms, later modified to run concurrently. The trial court denied the Defendant's motions for a new trial and other procedural requests (paras 1, 6-7).
Parties' Submissions
- Defendant-Appellant: Argued that the trial court committed errors, including allowing improper expert testimony, denying access to an expert, prosecutorial misconduct, denying a continuance, issuing improper jury instructions, and failing to clarify the application of the Earned Meritorious Deduction Act (paras 1, 8, 16, 20, 21, 29, 32).
- Plaintiff-Appellee: Contended that the trial court acted within its discretion, the expert testimony was permissible, the Defendant's procedural rights were not violated, and the jury instructions and sentencing were appropriate (paras 1, 8, 16, 20, 21, 29, 32).
Legal Issues
- Was the expert testimony improperly admitted, violating the principles established in State v. Alberico?
- Did the trial court err in denying the Defendant's request for transportation at the State's expense for an expert evaluation?
- Did the prosecutor engage in misconduct by vouching for the victim's credibility?
- Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying the Defendant's motion for a continuance?
- Did the identical jury instructions for multiple counts violate due process or double jeopardy?
- Should the judgment and sentence clarify the Defendant's eligibility for good time credit under the earlier version of the Earned Meritorious Deduction Act?
Disposition
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the Defendant's convictions and sentence.
- The case was remanded for the trial court to amend the judgment and sentence to clarify that the Defendant is eligible for good time credit under the earlier version of the Earned Meritorious Deduction Act (paras 1, 38-39).
Reasons
Per A. Joseph Alarid J. (Pickard and Robinson JJ. concurring):
Expert Testimony: The expert's testimony did not violate State v. Alberico as it did not improperly vouch for the victim's credibility or identify the Defendant as the perpetrator. The objections raised at trial were insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal (paras 8-15).
Transportation for Expert Evaluation: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Defendant's request for transportation at the State's expense. The Defendant failed to demonstrate indigence, necessity, or prejudice resulting from the denial (paras 16-19).
Prosecutorial Misconduct: The Defendant's claim of prosecutorial misconduct was not preserved for appeal, as no objections were raised during trial, and no fundamental error was argued (para 20).
Denial of Continuance: The trial court acted within its discretion in denying the Defendant's fifth request for a continuance. The Defendant had sufficient time to prepare, and the request was made shortly before trial without showing that additional time would accomplish the stated objectives (paras 21-28).
Jury Instructions: The identical jury instructions did not violate due process or double jeopardy. The evidence presented distinguished the counts sufficiently, and the jury demonstrated its ability to apply the evidence by convicting on some counts and acquitting on others (paras 29-31).
Good Time Credit: The Court found that the earlier version of the Earned Meritorious Deduction Act applied, as the jury's general verdict did not specify that any acts occurred after the statutory change in July 1999. The trial court must amend the judgment to reflect this (paras 32-37).