This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
The Defendant pled guilty in 1998 to several offenses, including battery, kidnapping with intent to commit a sexual offense, and attempted criminal sexual contact of a minor. At the time, New Mexico's sex offender registration law did not require registration for these offenses. Subsequent amendments to the law in 1999 and 2000 retroactively imposed registration requirements for these crimes, prompting the Defendant to challenge the constitutionality of the amended law (paras 1, 3, 5-7).
Procedural History
- District Court, 2000: The Defendant filed a motion challenging the applicability of the amended Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) to him, arguing it violated constitutional protections. The court denied the motion, holding that SORNA was not punitive and did not violate ex post facto laws or due process rights (paras 10-11).
Parties' Submissions
- Defendant-Appellant: Argued that retroactive application of SORNA violated the Ex Post Facto Clause, substantive and procedural due process rights, and Article IV, Section 34 of the New Mexico Constitution. He also claimed that the registration requirement impaired his plea agreement and sought specific performance of the agreement (paras 1, 11-12).
- Plaintiff-Appellee (State): Contended that SORNA was a civil, nonpunitive regulatory measure aimed at public safety and did not violate constitutional protections. The State also argued that the Defendant's plea agreement did not exempt him from future legislative changes (paras 2, 10, 13).
Legal Issues
- Did the retroactive application of SORNA violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States and New Mexico Constitutions?
- Did SORNA violate the Defendant's substantive and procedural due process rights?
- Did the retroactive application of SORNA violate Article IV, Section 34 of the New Mexico Constitution?
- Did the application of SORNA impair the Defendant's plea agreement in violation of the Contract Impairment Clauses of the United States and New Mexico Constitutions?
Disposition
- The Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of SORNA, rejecting the Defendant's claims under the Ex Post Facto Clause, due process, and Article IV, Section 34. The court also denied the Defendant's request for specific performance of his plea agreement and declined to address the Contract Impairment Clause argument due to lack of preservation (paras 2, 36-38, 114, 121-123).
Reasons
Per Sutin J. (Bustamante and Castillo JJ. concurring):
Ex Post Facto Clause: The court held that SORNA was a civil, nonpunitive regulatory measure aimed at public safety. Applying the Mendoza-Martinez factors, the court found that SORNA did not impose punishment and thus did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause (paras 26-38).
Substantive and Procedural Due Process: The court determined that SORNA's registration and notification provisions were rationally related to the legitimate governmental interest of protecting public safety. The Defendant's procedural due process claim was rejected under Connecticut v. Doe, as the law's requirements were based solely on conviction, not dangerousness. Substantive due process was not violated because the law passed rational basis scrutiny (paras 45-116).
Article IV, Section 34: The court found that the Defendant's case was not "pending" under the constitutional provision, as his conviction and sentence were final. The retroactive application of SORNA did not improperly alter his probation status (paras 39-44).
Contract Impairment Clause: The court declined to address this argument because it was not preserved at the district court level and was raised for the first time in the Defendant's reply brief (paras 121-123).
Specific Performance of Plea Agreement: The court held that the registration requirement was a collateral consequence of the Defendant's conviction and did not violate the plea agreement (paras 10, 122).