This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
The Defendant, frustrated by repeated vandalism at his car dealership in Española, New Mexico, armed himself with a shotgun and stood guard at the lot. He informed a police sergeant of his intentions earlier in the day. Around 4 a.m., police officers responded to a call about an armed individual at the lot. The Defendant complied slowly with police orders to disarm but continued using his phone despite commands to stop. Officers subdued him using force, pepper spray, and arrested him.
Procedural History
- Municipal Court: The Defendant was convicted of violating Española Municipal Ordinance Section 70-211(a)(4) for resisting or abusing a peace officer.
- District Court: On appeal for a trial de novo, the district court affirmed the conviction, finding the Defendant’s refusal to obey police orders constituted resisting under the ordinance.
Parties' Submissions
- Appellant (Defendant): Argued that his constitutional right to bear arms for self-defense was violated, the ordinance was unconstitutional as applied, the rule of lenity was ignored, he was not properly notified of charges, the ordinance was overbroad and vague, and the evidence did not support his conviction under Section 70-211(a)(4).
- Appellee (City of Española): Asserted that the Defendant’s refusal to comply with police orders during a lawful investigation constituted resisting under the ordinance.
Legal Issues
- Was there sufficient evidence to support the Defendant’s conviction under Española Municipal Ordinance Section 70-211(a)(4)?
- Does the ordinance’s interpretation align with the statutory framework of the Española Municipal Code?
Disposition
- The Court of Appeals reversed the Defendant’s conviction, holding that the evidence did not support a finding of resisting under Section 70-211(a)(4).
Reasons
Majority Opinion (Per Kennedy J., Robles J. concurring):
The Court found that the Defendant’s actions did not meet the definition of "resisting" under Section 70-211(a)(4). The ordinance, unlike its state counterpart, is narrower in scope due to the City’s choice to enact a separate provision, Section 70-212, addressing refusal to obey police orders. The Court emphasized that interpreting Section 70-211(a)(4) to include mere refusal to obey would render Section 70-212 redundant. The Defendant’s conduct, which involved slow compliance and continued phone use, did not constitute active resistance or abuse as required under Section 70-211(a)(4). The conviction was therefore unsupported by substantial evidence.
Dissenting Opinion (Fry C.J.):
Chief Judge Fry dissented, arguing that the Defendant’s refusal to comply with police commands while being the focus of their investigation fell within the scope of resisting under Section 70-211(a)(4). Fry C.J. contended that Section 70-212 applies to bystanders and not to individuals under police scrutiny, and thus the two provisions could coexist without redundancy. The Defendant’s conduct, including his failure to immediately comply with police orders, justified the conviction under Section 70-211(a)(4).