AI Generated Opinion Summaries

This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

Two individuals were arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI) on private property. In one case, the individual was found in a parked truck with the key in the ignition but the engine off, and in the other, the individual was in a running vehicle in a motel parking lot. Both individuals exhibited signs of intoxication and failed sobriety tests (paras 2-3).

Procedural History

• District Court: Dismissed the DWI charges, holding that the offense required the vehicle to be on a public highway (para 4).
• Court of Appeals: Affirmed the dismissals, concluding that "actual physical control" of a vehicle on private property does not constitute DWI under the statute (para 4).

Parties' Submissions

• State (Plaintiff-Petitioner): Argued that the DWI statute applies to both public and private property and that the defendants' actions constituted "actual physical control" of a vehicle while intoxicated (paras 1, 9).
• Defendants (Respondents): Contended that the DWI statute does not apply to private property when the vehicle is stationary and that the statutory definition of "driver" limits the offense to public highways (paras 9, 12-13).

Legal Issues

• Does the DWI statute apply to individuals in "actual physical control" of a non-moving vehicle on private property?
• Should the statutory definition of "driver" limit the application of the DWI statute to public highways?

Disposition

• The Supreme Court of New Mexico reversed the Court of Appeals' decisions and reinstated the DWI charges against the defendants (para 24).

Reasons

Majority Opinion (Per Baca J., with Serna and Maes JJ. concurring)

• The Court held that the DWI statute applies "within this state," which includes both public and private property, as explicitly stated in the statutory language (paras 7-8).
• The Court rejected the argument that the statutory definition of "driver" limits the offense to public highways, emphasizing that the Legislature intended the DWI statute to apply broadly to protect public safety (paras 13-14).
• The Court disapproved of the jury instruction (UJI 14-4511) and its commentary, which incorrectly suggested a public/private property distinction for DWI offenses (paras 15-16).
• The Court reasoned that allowing intoxicated individuals to exert "actual physical control" over vehicles on private property poses a significant risk to public safety, as such control could lead to vehicle operation (paras 19-21).

Dissenting Opinion (Per Minzner CJ., with Franchini J. concurring)

• The dissent argued that the statutory definition of "driver" limits the offense of DWI to public highways when based on "actual physical control" rather than "driving" (paras 26-30).
• The dissent expressed concerns about due process, asserting that the majority's interpretation was unforeseeable and retroactively expanded the scope of the DWI statute (paras 32-33).
• The dissent also questioned the correctness of the precedent set in Boone, which equated "driving" with "actual physical control" under the DWI statute (paras 34-36).