This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
The Defendant, a minor, was accused of disorderly conduct following an incident on July 7, 1989. While riding his bicycle, he was stopped by another individual who accused him of breaking into a van. The Defendant denied the accusation, and an argument ensued. When a police officer arrived, the Defendant continued to argue, used profane language, flailed his arms, and pointed at the accuser. The officer, concerned that a fight might erupt, intervened and ultimately arrested the Defendant for disorderly conduct (paras 2-6).
Procedural History
- Children's Court of Grant County: Found the Defendant guilty of disorderly conduct and issued a judgment and disposition.
Parties' Submissions
- Defendant-Appellant: Argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for disorderly conduct and that the disorderly conduct statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad (headnotes, paras 1, 9, 20).
- Plaintiff-Appellee: Asserted that the Defendant's speech and conduct constituted disorderly conduct under the statute and that the statute was neither vague nor overbroad (paras 9-23).
Legal Issues
- Was there sufficient evidence to support the Defendant's conviction for disorderly conduct?
- Is the disorderly conduct statute unconstitutionally vague or overbroad?
Disposition
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the Defendant's conviction for disorderly conduct (para 24).
Reasons
Per Chavez J. (Apodaca and Hartz JJ. concurring):
Sufficiency of Evidence:
The Court held that the Defendant's speech and conduct, including the use of profane language, flailing arms, and pointing, constituted "fighting words" under the doctrine established in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire. Such words are not protected by the First Amendment as they are likely to provoke a violent reaction and disturb the peace. The Court found that the Defendant's actions reasonably led the officer to believe a fight might occur, satisfying the statutory requirement of conduct tending to disturb the peace (paras 9-19).
Vagueness and Overbreadth:
The Court rejected the Defendant's argument that the disorderly conduct statute was unconstitutionally vague. It found that the statute provided adequate warning to a person of ordinary intelligence about what conduct was prohibited. The Court also held that the statute was not overbroad, as it could be narrowly construed to punish only "fighting words" and conduct that disturbs the peace, thereby avoiding any infringement on constitutionally protected speech (paras 20-23).
Conclusion:
The Court concluded that the Defendant's conviction was supported by sufficient evidence and that the statute was constitutionally valid (para 24).