AI Generated Opinion Summaries

This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

A worker, employed as a carpenter, was exposed to stripping chemicals in an unventilated room on March 5, 1987, despite having a preexisting lung condition (chronic obstructive pulmonary disease). This exposure led to permanent total disability, recognized in a compensation order dated March 23, 1988. The worker died on April 30, 1989, from acute pulmonary embolus with pulmonary infarction. His widow subsequently filed a claim for death benefits on December 1, 1989 (paras 2-3).

Procedural History

• Workers' Compensation Administration, March 23, 1988: The worker was awarded permanent total disability benefits, with findings that the chemical exposure caused his disability and that he knew or should have known of his compensable injury on August 17, 1987 (para 2).
• Court of Appeals, April 18, 1989: Affirmed the compensation order awarding disability benefits (para 2).

Parties' Submissions

• Employer (Marriott Hotel and Argonaut Insurance Company): Argued that the widow's claim for death benefits was time-barred under Section 52-1-46, as the two-year limitation period should run from the date of the accidental injury (March 5, 1987) rather than the date the worker knew or should have known of the compensable injury (August 17, 1987) (paras 4-5).
• Subsequent Injury Fund (Fund): Contended that the employer failed to substantially comply with the Subsequent Injury Act (SIA) by not obtaining the worker's signature on the certificate of preexisting impairment while he was alive. The Fund also argued that the apportionment of liability was unsupported by evidence and contrary to the SIA's purpose (paras 16-17).
• Widow: Supported the award of death benefits, arguing that the two-year limitation should run from the date the worker knew or should have known of the compensable injury. She also requested attorney's fees for the appeal (paras 4, 22).

Legal Issues

• Whether the two-year limitation period for death benefits under Section 52-1-46 begins from the date of the accidental injury or the date the worker knew or should have known of a compensable injury.
• Whether the employer substantially complied with the requirements of the Subsequent Injury Act (SIA) to hold the Fund liable for apportionment of benefits.

Disposition

• The award of death benefits to the widow was affirmed (para 15).
• The apportionment of liability to the Subsequent Injury Fund was reversed (para 21).
• The widow was awarded $2,000 in attorney's fees for the appeal (para 22).

Reasons

Per Chavez J. (Alarid C.J. concurring):

• Two-Year Limitation Period: The court held that the two-year limitation period under Section 52-1-46 begins from the date the worker knew or should have known of a compensable injury, consistent with prior case law (e.g., Casias v. Zia Co.). This interpretation aligns with the legislative intent to provide financial security to workers and their dependents and avoids penalizing workers for latent injuries (paras 5-15).
• Subsequent Injury Fund Compliance: The court found that the employer failed to substantially comply with the SIA because it did not attempt to obtain the worker's signature on the certificate of preexisting impairment during the 20 months the worker was alive after filing his claim. This failure undermined the documentation and retention purposes of the SIA, precluding liability for the Fund (paras 17-21).
• Attorney's Fees: The court awarded $2,000 in attorney's fees to the widow under Section 52-1-54(E) (para 22).

Per Bivins J., dissenting:

• Two-Year Limitation Period: Bivins J. dissented, arguing that the plain language of Section 52-1-46 requires the two-year limitation period to run from the date of the accidental injury (March 5, 1987). He emphasized that the statute is clear and unambiguous, and the majority's reliance on Casias was misplaced, as that case dealt with a different provision of the Workers' Compensation Act (paras 25-39).
• Constitutionality: Bivins J. briefly addressed the widow's constitutional challenge, noting that the issue was not necessary to resolve given his interpretation of the statute. However, he acknowledged that the statute's constitutionality under equal protection principles could be questioned (paras 40-48).