This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
A drunk driver struck and killed a pedestrian, the mother of a minor, while the minor witnessed the accident. The minor, who was not physically injured, later exhibited symptoms of emotional distress, including crying, shaking, and sleep difficulties. The family sought compensation under their uninsured motorist (UM) insurance policy, which provided coverage for bodily injury but excluded emotional injuries (paras 2-3, 10).
Procedural History
- District Court of Bernalillo County: Granted summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff, Economy Preferred Insurance Company (EPIC), ruling that the UM provisions of the insurance policy did not cover emotional distress claims (para 4).
Parties' Submissions
- Appellant (Defendant, parent of the minor): Argued that the term "bodily injury" in the UM policy was ambiguous and should include emotional distress accompanied by physical manifestations. Claimed that the minor's symptoms, such as crying, shaking, and sleep difficulties, constituted physical manifestations of emotional distress, warranting additional compensation under the policy (paras 4, 8-10).
- Appellee (Plaintiff, EPIC): Contended that the policy language explicitly excluded emotional injuries and that the minor's symptoms were purely emotional or psychological in nature, falling outside the definition of "bodily injury" (paras 4, 8).
Legal Issues
- Whether the term "bodily injury" in the UM insurance policy includes emotional distress accompanied by physical manifestations.
- Whether the minor's symptoms of emotional distress qualify as "bodily injury" under the policy's terms.
Disposition
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the UM policy did not cover the minor's emotional distress claims (para 13).
Reasons
Per Fry J. (Alarid and Castillo JJ. concurring):
The court found that the term "bodily injury," as defined in the UM policy, unambiguously referred to physical harm and excluded emotional or psychological injuries. The policy's language limited recovery to damages arising from physical injuries, and the minor's symptoms, such as crying, shaking, and sleep difficulties, did not meet the threshold for "bodily injury" (paras 7-8, 10).
The court acknowledged that some jurisdictions recognize physical manifestations of emotional distress as bodily injury but concluded that the minor's symptoms were insufficient to qualify. The court emphasized that interpreting the policy otherwise would improperly extend coverage to all emotional injuries, contrary to the policy's plain language and precedent (paras 9-11).
The court also rejected the argument that the distinction between negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) and loss of consortium claims affected the interpretation of "bodily injury." The court held that the policy's terms, not the nature of the tort claim, governed the scope of coverage (para 12).