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Facts

Broom Transportation, Inc. sought to transfer its certificate of public convenience and necessity for transporting water and oilfield supplies to Hughes Services, Inc. AA Oilfield Service, Inc. and other common carriers opposed the transfer, arguing that Broom had not provided reasonably continuous service under the certificate. Broom had ceased operations under parts of the certificate and sought voluntary suspension while attempting to transfer it (paras 1, 3-7).

Procedural History

  • State Corporation Commission, March 6, 1990: Granted Broom's petition to transfer its certificate to Hughes and denied AA Oilfield's petition to revoke the certificate (para 7).
  • District Court of Santa Fe County, July 1, 1992: Affirmed the Commission's decision to allow the transfer and deny the revocation (para 7).

Parties' Submissions

  • Appellants (AA Oilfield Service, Inc. and other carriers): Argued that Broom failed to provide reasonably continuous service as required by law, rendering the transfer invalid. They also contended that the Commission's failure to provide notice and a hearing before suspending the certificate violated their rights (paras 1, 7, 12, 15).
  • Respondents (Broom Transportation, Inc. and Hughes Services, Inc.): Asserted that the Commission had the authority to grant voluntary suspensions and that equitable principles, including estoppel, should prevent the application of the continuous service requirement. They argued that the transfer was in the public interest (paras 7, 20-23).

Legal Issues

  • Did the Commission have the authority to grant voluntary suspensions of certificates without notice and a hearing?
  • Was the failure to provide notice and a hearing before suspending Broom's certificate harmless error?
  • Did Broom satisfy the statutory requirement of reasonably continuous service prior to the transfer application?
  • Could the Commission or the district court apply equitable estoppel to prevent the application of the continuous service requirement?
  • Was the Commission collaterally estopped from approving the transfer due to prior findings of dormancy?

Disposition

  • The Supreme Court of New Mexico affirmed the district court's decision, upholding the Commission's order to transfer Broom's certificate to Hughes (para 26).

Reasons

Per Ransom J. (Baca and Frost JJ. concurring):

Authority to Grant Voluntary Suspensions: The Commission had implicit authority under the Motor Carrier Act to grant voluntary suspensions of certificates. However, notice and a hearing were required for interested parties, as the suspension affected public convenience and necessity (paras 8-13).

Harmless Error in Notice and Hearing: The failure to provide notice and a hearing before suspending Broom's certificate was deemed harmless because AA Oilfield could not demonstrate any prejudice or harm resulting from the suspension (para 14).

Reasonably Continuous Service: Broom did not provide reasonably continuous service after ceasing operations in 1986. However, the determination of whether service was continuous in light of multiple transfer applications was a factual issue for the Commission to decide (paras 15-17).

Equitable Estoppel: The Commission was estopped from applying the continuous service requirement to Broom due to its own actions and representations, which led Broom to believe that its certificate would not be revoked while attempting to transfer it. The district court properly affirmed this application of estoppel (paras 20-23).

Collateral Estoppel: The Commission was not collaterally estopped from approving the transfer despite prior findings of dormancy, as the equities favored allowing the transfer in the public interest (paras 24-25).

Public Interest: The transfer was found to be in the public interest, and AA Oilfield did not contest this finding. The Court concluded that equity and justice supported the Commission's decision (paras 23, 26).

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