This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
The Defendant was found in possession of methamphetamine and related paraphernalia during a probation officer's visit to her home. The items included 7.03 grams, 2.71 grams, and 0.61 grams of methamphetamine, along with scales, baggies, syringes, and a pipe with residue. The State alleged that some of the methamphetamine was intended for distribution, while the rest was for personal use (paras 3-4).
Procedural History
- State v. Quick, No. 27,013 (N.M. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2008): The Court of Appeals upheld the Defendant’s convictions for possession of methamphetamine and possession with intent to distribute, finding that the evidence supported separate factual bases for the two charges (para 1).
Parties' Submissions
- Defendant: Argued that her convictions for possession and possession with intent to distribute violated the double jeopardy clause because they were based on a single act of possession (paras 1, 4).
- State: Contended that the evidence presented at trial demonstrated distinct factual bases for the two convictions, as the methamphetamine and related paraphernalia indicated both personal use and intent to distribute (paras 1, 10, 12).
Legal Issues
- Did the Defendant’s convictions for possession of methamphetamine and possession with intent to distribute violate the double jeopardy clause? (para 5)
Disposition
- The Supreme Court of New Mexico reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the district court to vacate the Defendant’s conviction for simple possession (paras 2, 22).
Reasons
Per Chávez CJ (Serna, Bosson, and Daniels JJ. concurring):
The Court held that the New Mexico Legislature intended the crimes of possession and possession with intent to distribute to apply in the alternative when based on a single act of possession. Since all the methamphetamine was found in the Defendant’s control at the same time and place, her conduct constituted a single act of possession. The evidence did not support separate factual bases for the two charges, and convicting the Defendant of both offenses violated the double jeopardy clause (paras 2, 16-20).
Per Maes J. (specially concurring):
Justice Maes agreed with the majority that the Defendant’s convictions violated the double jeopardy clause but emphasized that a defendant may be convicted of both offenses if the charges are based on separate acts of possession. In this case, however, all the methamphetamine was found in the same location and at the same time, and there was no evidence to distinguish the intended purposes of the different quantities. Thus, the Defendant’s conduct was unitary (paras 24-30).