This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
The Defendant was charged with multiple offenses, including felony DWI (fourth offense), driving with a suspended or revoked license, no proof of financial responsibility, and careless driving. Unable to meet initial bond conditions, the Defendant spent nearly three months in jail before being released under a court-ordered electronic monitoring program with strict conditions, including house arrest, alcohol treatment, and random urinalysis. The Defendant complied with these conditions for seven and a half months until sentencing (paras 2-4).
Procedural History
- District Court, Santa Fe County: The trial court sentenced the Defendant to 18 months imprisonment, with 12 months suspended and one year of unsupervised probation. The court granted presentence confinement credit for the time spent in jail but denied credit for the time spent under electronic monitoring, citing a lack of authority under the DWI statute (paras 1, 4).
Parties' Submissions
- Appellant (Defendant): Argued that the time spent under house arrest with electronic monitoring qualified as "official confinement" under the precedent set in State v. Fellhauer and should be credited toward his sentence (paras 1, 7-8).
- Appellee (State): Contended that house arrest under electronic monitoring did not meet the criteria for "official confinement" and that the DWI statute did not authorize such credit. The State also argued that the conditions of release were not sufficiently restrictive to warrant credit (paras 5, 10).
Legal Issues
- Whether time spent under house arrest with electronic monitoring qualifies as "official confinement" for the purpose of presentence confinement credit under New Mexico law.
Disposition
- The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to grant the Defendant presentence confinement credit for the time spent under electronic monitoring (para 12).
Reasons
Per Pickard J. (Castillo and Robinson JJ. concurring):
The Court applied the two-prong test from State v. Fellhauer to determine whether the Defendant's house arrest qualified as "official confinement." The test requires (1) limitations on the Defendant's freedom of movement or constructive custody by law enforcement, and (2) liability for escape if the conditions of release are violated (para 7).
The Court found that the Defendant's conditions of release, including house arrest with electronic monitoring, random urinalysis, and alcohol treatment, imposed significant restrictions on his freedom of movement. The Defendant was required to remain at home except for specific purposes, and his compliance was closely monitored by correctional officers. These conditions were deemed more restrictive than a mere curfew and comparable to constructive custody (paras 8-9).
The Court rejected the State's argument that house arrest is not sufficiently restrictive or "extraordinary" to warrant credit. It emphasized that the Defendant was subject to escape charges for non-compliance, satisfying the second prong of the Fellhauer test. The Court concluded that the Defendant was entitled to presentence confinement credit for the time spent under electronic monitoring (paras 10-11).