This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
The case concerns the interpretation of a will left by the deceased, Mrs. Shirley Lee Russell. The dispute centers on the meaning of the term "personal property" in the will and whether it includes both tangible and intangible personal property. Mrs. Russell's estate included real property valued at $149,000 and other assets worth over $375,000. The will devised her home and personal property to her niece and two nephews in equal shares, while the residuary clause left the remainder of her estate to one nephew. A letter of instructions was also left, directing the disposition of certain tangible personal property (paras 2-3).
Procedural History
- District Court, May 18, 1993: The court waived the requirement for the Defendant to post a bond as personal representative of the estate, following a stipulation by the parties (paras 3-4).
- District Court, November 1, 1993: The court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendant, holding that the term "personal property" in the will referred only to tangible personal property, with intangible personal property passing to the Defendant under the residuary clause (para 7).
Parties' Submissions
- Plaintiffs-Appellants: Argued that the term "personal property" in the will unambiguously includes both tangible and intangible personal property, entitling them to an equal share of all personal property (para 5).
- Defendant-Appellee: Contended that the term "personal property" in the will was limited to tangible personal property, as indicated by the reference to New Mexico law and the letter of instructions. He argued that intangible personal property passed to him under the residuary clause (para 5).
Legal Issues
- Whether the term "personal property" in the will includes both tangible and intangible personal property.
- Whether the Plaintiffs were entitled to excuse the trial judge after invoking the court's discretion in the probate proceeding.
Disposition
- The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Defendant and denial of summary judgment to the Plaintiffs, holding that the term "personal property" includes both tangible and intangible personal property (para 13).
- The Court affirmed the trial court's denial of the Plaintiffs' attempt to excuse the trial judge (para 17).
Reasons
Per Bosson J. (Donnelly and Flores JJ. concurring):
Interpretation of "Personal Property": The Court held that the term "personal property" in the will was clear and unambiguous, encompassing both tangible and intangible personal property. The Court emphasized that absent language in the will indicating otherwise, the customary meaning of "personal property" includes all forms of personal property except real estate. The Court rejected the Defendant's argument that the reference to New Mexico law and the letter of instructions limited the term to tangible personal property, noting that the will did not explicitly make such a distinction (paras 8-13).
Excusal of Trial Judge: The Court found that the Plaintiffs' initial demand for a bond invoked the trial court's discretion, barring their subsequent attempt to excuse the judge in the probate proceeding. Additionally, the Plaintiffs failed to pursue their second notice of excusal in the separate civil action, effectively waiving their right to challenge the judge's designation in that proceeding (paras 14-16).
Disposition: The Court remanded the case with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs, awarding them an equal share of all personal property, both tangible and intangible, as devised under the will (para 17).