AI Generated Opinion Summaries

This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

The Defendant, while participating in an inmate-release program at Camp Sierra Blanca in New Mexico, was granted a 48-hour furlough to secure housing in Albuquerque. During the furlough, his borrowed car broke down twice, causing him to return to the camp 22 hours late. Despite notifying camp staff of the delays, he was convicted of escape from the inmate-release program under NMSA 1978, Section 33-2-46 (paras 2-3).

Procedural History

• Trial Court: The Defendant was convicted of escape from an inmate-release program and sentenced to a three-year term of imprisonment, which was suspended, with an additional four-year enhancement under the Habitual Offender Act (para 2).
• State v. Rosaire, 1996-NMCA-115: The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the jury instructions failed to include an essential element of the crime, specifically the requirement of "willfulness" (paras 1, 3).

Parties' Submissions

• State: Argued that the trial court's jury instructions were correct and that the Court of Appeals misconstrued Section 33-2-46. The State contended that the statute does not require proof of intent never to return but only intent not to return at the prescribed time (paras 1, 9).
• Defendant: Asserted that the jury instructions were defective for omitting the statutory requirement of "willfulness" and argued that the statute requires proof of intent never to return to the inmate-release program (paras 3, 9).

Legal Issues

• Did the trial court err in failing to include "willfulness" as an essential element in the jury instructions?
• Does Section 33-2-46 require proof of intent never to return, or merely intent not to return at the prescribed time?

Disposition

• The Supreme Court of New Mexico affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision to reverse the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial (paras 13-15).

Reasons

Per Minzner J. (Franchini C.J., Serna J., and McKinnon J. concurring):

The Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the jury instructions were defective for failing to include the statutory requirement of "willfulness." The term "willful" was interpreted to mean a failure to return without justification or excuse, distinguishing it from a strict liability offense. The omission of this element constituted reversible error (paras 7-8, 13).

The Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals' interpretation that the statute requires proof of intent never to return. Instead, it held that the statute requires proof of intent not to return at the prescribed time. The Court emphasized that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the failure to return was both purposeful and without justification or excuse (paras 9-12, 14).

The Court adopted the interpretation from State v. Tarango, holding that Section 33-2-46 creates a specific intent crime requiring both a willful failure to return and an intent not to return (para 11). The case was remanded for a new trial with proper jury instructions that include the element of "willfulness" (paras 13-15).