This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
The case arose from a 1985 car collision at an intersection in Santa Fe, New Mexico, where the Defendant's left turn placed his vehicle in the path of the Plaintiff's car. The Plaintiff suffered injuries, including a closed-head injury, and alleged negligence on the Defendant's part. The Defendant was cited for failure to yield the right of way (paras 4-5).
Procedural History
- Trial Court, 1989: The jury awarded the Plaintiff $91,267.20 in damages, reduced to $69,363.15 due to comparative negligence (76% Defendant, 24% Plaintiff). The court denied the Plaintiff's request for a "sudden emergency" jury instruction and ruled the Plaintiff was not the prevailing party for costs under Rule 54(E) because the adjusted award was less than the Defendant's $70,000 Rule 68 offer of judgment (paras 6-8).
- Court of Appeals, 1992: Reversed the trial court, holding the Plaintiff was entitled to a "sudden emergency" instruction and was the prevailing party under Rule 54(E). The case was remanded for a new trial on liability and damages (paras 9-10).
Parties' Submissions
- Defendant: Argued for the abolition of the "sudden emergency" doctrine, claiming it was unnecessary, confusing, and inconsistent with the philosophy of New Mexico's Uniform Jury Instructions. Also contended that the Plaintiff was not the prevailing party under Rule 54(E) due to the Rule 68 offer of judgment (paras 1, 11).
- Plaintiff: Asserted entitlement to a "sudden emergency" jury instruction based on the circumstances of the collision. Further argued that she was the prevailing party under Rule 54(E) and should recover preoffer costs, which should be added to the judgment for comparison with the Rule 68 offer (paras 9, 28, 32).
Legal Issues
- Should the "sudden emergency" doctrine and its corresponding jury instruction be abolished in New Mexico negligence cases?
- Is the Plaintiff the prevailing party under Rule 54(E) and entitled to recover costs, including preoffer costs, despite the Rule 68 offer of judgment?
- How should costs be allocated when a Rule 68 offer of judgment exceeds the adjusted jury award?
Disposition
- The "sudden emergency" doctrine and its jury instruction were abolished in New Mexico negligence cases (paras 2, 26).
- The Plaintiff was deemed the prevailing party under Rule 54(E) and entitled to recover preoffer costs (paras 28-29).
- The case was remanded to the trial court to determine the Plaintiff's preoffer costs and reassess the allocation of costs under Rule 68 (paras 36, 42).
Reasons
Per Montgomery J. (Franchini and Frost JJ. concurring):
Abolition of the "sudden emergency" doctrine: The Court found the doctrine unnecessary and confusing, as it merely restates the standard of ordinary care already covered by UJI Civil 1603. The instruction risks overemphasizing one party's theory and misleading jurors into believing a different standard of care applies in emergencies. The doctrine's historical roots in contributory negligence are incompatible with New Mexico's comparative negligence framework (paras 2, 12-26).
Prevailing party and costs: The Court held that the Plaintiff, as the party recovering a judgment, was the prevailing party under Rule 54(E). Rule 68 limits postoffer costs but does not negate the Plaintiff's entitlement to preoffer costs. The Court clarified that preoffer costs should be added to the adjusted jury award when comparing it to a Rule 68 offer of judgment (paras 28-36).
Remand for cost determination: The trial court must evaluate the Plaintiff's preoffer costs and reassess the allocation of costs under Rule 68. If the Plaintiff's recovery, including preoffer costs, exceeds the Rule 68 offer, she is entitled to all costs. Otherwise, she must pay her postoffer costs and the Defendant's postoffer costs (paras 36, 42).
Guidance on taxable costs: The Court emphasized that only necessary and reasonable costs should be awarded, with discretion exercised sparingly to promote litigation economy. Costs not specifically authorized by statute or precedent should be carefully scrutinized (paras 38-41).