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Decision Information

Citations - New Mexico Appellate Reports
Truong v. Allstate Insurance Co. - cited by 27 documents

Decision Content

This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

A class of Allstate Insurance policyholders alleged that Allstate used a claims processing software, Colossus, to systematically undervalue and underpay insurance claims. The plaintiffs argued that this practice violated the New Mexico Unfair Practices Act (UPA). Allstate contended that its use of Colossus was exempt from UPA scrutiny because it was "expressly permitted" by the New Mexico Public Regulation Commission (NMPRC) through a Market Conduct Examination (MCE) that reviewed its claims handling practices (paras 1-2, 4).

Procedural History

  • District Court: The court found that the MCE conducted by the NMPRC effectively "expressly permitted" Allstate's use of Colossus, barring the plaintiffs' UPA claims (paras 14, 16).
  • Court of Appeals, 2008-NMCA-051: The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the MCE implicitly approved Allstate's use of Colossus under a newly created three-part test for determining "express permission" (paras 17-18).

Parties' Submissions

  • Plaintiffs: Argued that Allstate's use of Colossus systematically undervalued claims, violating the UPA. They contended that the MCE did not "expressly permit" the use of Colossus and that the district court erred in barring their claims (paras 2, 16, 20).
  • Defendants (Allstate): Asserted that the MCE conducted by the NMPRC and its subsequent adoption by the Superintendent of Insurance constituted "express permission" for the use of Colossus, exempting their practices from UPA scrutiny (paras 8, 14, 18).
  • Amicus Curiae (Insurance Division and Attorney General): Supported the plaintiffs, arguing that the MCE did not provide the explicit, public documentation required to constitute "express permission" under the UPA (paras 61-62).

Legal Issues

  • Did the NMPRC's Market Conduct Examination and its adoption by the Superintendent of Insurance "expressly permit" Allstate's use of Colossus, thereby exempting it from UPA scrutiny? (paras 1, 20).
  • What is the proper standard of review for determining whether conduct is "expressly permitted" under the UPA? (paras 22-23).

Disposition

  • The Supreme Court of New Mexico reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, holding that the MCE did not "expressly permit" Allstate's use of Colossus and remanded the case for further proceedings (paras 21, 66).

Reasons

Per Daniels J. (Chávez C.J., Serna, Maes, and Bosson JJ. concurring):

  • Statutory Interpretation: The Court emphasized that the term "expressly permitted" in the UPA requires clear, explicit, and unmistakable permission. The MCE and its adoption by the Superintendent did not meet this standard, as they contained no specific reference to Colossus or its use (paras 37-40).
  • Plain Meaning: The Court applied the plain meaning of "expressly," which excludes inferred or implied permissions. The absence of explicit statements in the MCE or the Superintendent's certificate precluded a finding of express permission (paras 38-40).
  • Legislative Intent: The Court noted that the 1999 amendments to the UPA, which added the term "expressly," were intended to narrow the scope of the exemption and ensure that regulatory silence or general oversight would not shield conduct from UPA scrutiny (paras 34-36).
  • Precedent: The Court distinguished this case from prior decisions, such as Valdez v. State and Azar v. Prudential Insurance Co., emphasizing that only explicit, pre-conduct regulatory approval can create an exemption under the UPA (paras 46-51).
  • Public Documentation Requirement: The Court held that express permission must be clearly articulated in a public document to provide fair notice to all affected parties. The MCE and its adoption failed to meet this requirement (paras 61-62).
  • Standard of Review: The Court determined that whether conduct is "expressly permitted" under the UPA is a legal question subject to de novo review, not a factual issue requiring deference to the trial court's findings (paras 22-27).
  • Class Certification and Jury Waiver: The Court declined to address Allstate's challenge to class certification and the issue of jury waiver, as they were rendered moot by the Court's decision on the primary issue (paras 63-65).

The Court concluded that the MCE did not "expressly permit" Allstate's use of Colossus, and the plaintiffs' UPA claims should proceed (paras 66-67).

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