This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
A 14-year-old minor was struck by a car while riding his bicycle on July 12, 1990. The Plaintiffs, the minor and his father, alleged that the accident occurred due to the City of Santa Fe's negligent maintenance and inspection of the street where the incident took place. The City received notice of the claim 125 days after the accident, exceeding the 90-day notice requirement under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act (paras 1, 3).
Procedural History
- District Court of Santa Fe County: Dismissed the father's claim due to late notice but denied the City's motion for summary judgment against the minor, finding that the notice period was tolled because of the minor's status (para 1).
Parties' Submissions
- Defendant (City of Santa Fe): Argued that the minor's claim should be barred for failure to comply with the 90-day notice requirement under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act (para 1).
- Plaintiffs (Minor and Father): Contended that the notice requirement was tolled due to the minor's status and that applying the notice provision to a minor violated due process (paras 1, 4).
Legal Issues
- Does the 90-day notice requirement under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act apply to minors?
- Does the application of the notice requirement to minors violate due process?
Disposition
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of the City's motion for summary judgment (para 11).
Reasons
Per Black J. (Minzner C.J. concurring):
The Court held that the application of the 90-day notice requirement to minors must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, considering due process principles. The Court found that factual issues, such as when the minor retained counsel and whether he was otherwise able to comply with the notice requirement, precluded summary judgment. While the district court's interpretation of prior case law (Tafoya v. Doe) was overly broad, the denial of summary judgment was upheld because the record raised material factual questions (paras 9-11).
Special Concurrence by Apodaca J.:
Judge Apodaca disagreed with the majority's fact-based approach, arguing that under Tafoya, minors should be categorically excused from complying with the 90-day notice requirement as a matter of law. He emphasized that minors lack the legal capacity to appoint counsel or comply with statutory requirements, and the legislature has not explicitly made the notice provision applicable to minors. He also criticized the majority's reliance on Howie v. Stevens, asserting that it misconstrued Tafoya and should be limited to its facts or overruled (paras 13-16).